

CHAPTER 15

STATESMANSHIP AND ETHICS:

ARON, MAX WEBER, AND POLITICS AS A VOCATION

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Raymond Aron discovered Max Weber around the same time that he discovered Karl Marx—in the early 1930s, during his sojourn in Germany. These thinkers represented a fraction of the total number of German authors he delved into at the time, including Husserl, Heidegger, and the Southwest School of neo-Kantians (Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm Windelband).¹ It was in Max Weber's writings that Aron eventually found the resources and the words to express the relationship between politics and morality.² Moreover, Aron also found in Weber an exposition of the tension between knowledge (science) and action (politics). There are genuine trade-offs between a profession that demands the absolute pursuit of truth and one that demands the willingness to compromise not only one's own morals (anathema to the moralist) but even the truth itself (anathema to the scientist). This variance at the root of science and politics is probably why Aron was so fond of "failed" statesmen: Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Weber himself. All of them partook to some extent in politics or war, and they were incredibly gifted thinkers who reflected on the nature of politics or war.

The 1930s were rife with political agitation and a looming war, and thus Weber confirmed Aron's intuition that history was once again on the move. Compared to Émile Durkheim, who dominated Aron's sociological education at the École normale supérieure, Weber seemed to have caught on to the spirit of the time in a most stimulating way.³ Weber's methodology was also more congenial to Aron's approach because it takes individuals and their intentions as the starting point. Hence, both thinkers can preserve some degree of freedom for their actors. This freedom is crucial, for if they want to cross the bridge from knowledge to action, then they must believe that actors have at least *some* role to play in forming the future.

The young French student paid his respects to the imposing German thinker by showering him with unabashed admiration and giving him pride of place in

his first published work on German sociology.⁴ Thirty years later, he could not help but continue to evince a profound, albeit mitigated, respect for Weber, even when he disagreed with him.⁵ One of the most important influences of Weber on Aron (and one of the explanations for the former's methodology) was the recognition of the relation between knowledge and action, or science and politics.⁶ Both Raymond Aron and Max Weber were social scientists who commented on the politics of their day and yet never managed to adapt to the conditions necessary to partake fully of political life. We will now turn to Weber to investigate those conditions.

On January 28, 1919, against the backdrop of the November Revolution of 1918, Weber gave his famous *Politik als Beruf* lecture before the Münchner Freistudentischer Bund. One could even say that politics surrounded the origins of the lecture itself: Weber initially did not want to give the talk and recommended Friedrich Naumann in his stead. Naumann was ill at the time and it seemed like the opportunity might be passed to Kurt Eisner, whereupon Weber, who cared deeply about the success of the new German democracy, rose to the occasion in order to prevent Eisner from adding any more to the revolutionary fervor of the students.⁷ Weber defines politics early on in this lecture as "striving for a share of power or influence over the division of power, be it between states or between groups of people within states."⁸ It is here that Weber also sets forth the three qualities that are prerequisites to embarking on a political career: passion (*Leidenschaft*), feeling of responsibility (*Verantwortungsgefühl*), and sense of proportion (*Augenmaß*).

As far as Aron's engagement with this particular teaching is concerned, he focuses primarily on the dichotomy and implications of Weber's ethic of conviction (*Gesinnungsethik*) and ethic of responsibility (*Verantwortungsethik*). These two ethics follow on Weber's discussion of the relation between ethics and politics. That the ethic required for effective statesmanship might be different from the personal ethic necessary to be a good Christian, say, is an idea that goes as far back as Machiavelli. Unlike his Florentine predecessor, the fulcrum of political morality in Weber's construct is not only about having the fortitude to choose potentially disagreeable means in order to achieve desired ends, but also having the fortitude to take responsibility for the consequences, intended and unintended, of political action.

Max Weber's Ethics and Politics

The moralist of conviction (*Gesinnungsethiker*), by contrast, seems at first glance to be content to turn a blind eye to the consequences of his actions—even if such behavior is counterproductive to his goals—so long as his actions do not betray his conscience. Weber gives the example of the syndicalist who would be unmoved by the fact that his actions could provoke a greater reaction against his social class and its interests. One might scoff at the absurdity of the moralist's tendency to abrogate concern for the repercussions of his actions, but what is undeniable is that, within his own moral framework, he is doing right.

Aron thought that Weber had in mind two different types of people when he elaborated on his ethic of conviction: the pacifists of Christian inspiration and the revolutionaries. Weber's contention with respect to the former was that if their moral position were entirely swept away, accepting the status of the defeated party, they would be inviting the victors, now in complete control of the moral high ground, to force them into a treaty so unfair that it would sow the seeds of discontent and, in effect, undermine the very pacifism that was their creed. As for the latter, the revolutionaries were guilty of positing their goal as an absolute value whose price of attainment could never be too high.⁹ Aron knew that whereof Weber spoke: he, too, had to stand up for reason and responsibility in the carnival of French public life.

We cannot separate these two ethics so easily, for conceptual problems seem to abound. On the one hand, how can there be an ethic of responsibility without a reference point toward which responsibility is directed? Conviction is therefore a precondition for responsibility.¹⁰ On the other hand, to the extent that the ethic of conviction also means satisfying one's conscience, and not just the exigencies of one's faith, how can we be so certain that one's conscience would not be adversely affected by the failure to achieve an outcome consonant with one's convictions? In this sense, conviction could potentially presuppose responsibility, that is, a concern for consequences. For Aron these two ethics might not only be conceptually flawed, but even destructive, since they offer a sort of justification to the false realists and false idealists: the former can disregard moral injunctions with impunity, while the latter can wantonly blind themselves to the critical role they are playing in contributing to the collapse of the existing order, thereby paving the way for revolutionaries or tyrants to rule. There is an additional problem worth highlighting: if the dividing line between the two ethics is characterized more or less by concern (or lack thereof) for the consequences of any given action, then it must be assumed that the actor in question has had the opportunity to consider (or refuse to consider) the potential consequences of his actions. This assumption prompts Aron to observe that Weber has conflated two different antinomies: political action vs. Christian action and considered decision vs. immediate choice.¹¹

Max Weber himself seems to have an ambiguous view of the reconcilability of the two ethics. At first, he states that the decisive point is that there are two "fundamentally different, irrevocably opposed maxims," which are the two ethics. He is, however, also quick to add that neither ethic implies the absolute absence of the other; that is, the ethic of conviction is not equivalent to a lack of responsibility, and the ethic of responsibility is not equivalent to a lack of conviction. In this sense they are ideal types and therefore function as heuristic tools to acquire a keener understanding of the inevitable trade-offs that characterize politics as a vocation. Toward the end of the lecture, though, Weber declares that politics is not conducted with the head alone; and at that point, it would seem that it is not enough, as one might earlier have thought, for a politician to act according to the ethic of responsibility, but that the true politician must combine both ethics. More pointedly, the politician's conviction must be not just sterile excitement

(*sterile Aufgeregtheit*), but real passion (*echte Leidenschaft*) for the responsibility that defines political life. For Weber it is a stirring sight to behold a politically mature man, “who feels with his whole soul the responsibility he bears for the real consequences of his actions, and who acts on the basis of an ethics of responsibility, [and] says at some point, ‘Here I stand, I can do no other.’”¹²

One scholar, Hans Henrik Bruun, believes that Weber was hereby indicating a third ethic that he has termed the “responsible ethic of conviction.”¹³ The politician must act with a feeling of responsibility, but also with awareness of the values he is preserving or destroying in acting thus. Lastly, he must acknowledge two other inconvenient facts: once he has initiated the causal chain, he may bring about consequences *contrary to his intentions*, and the causal chain cannot necessarily be stopped at will once it has been set in motion. This all amounts to a very heavy moral burden for the politician.

Politics presents aspiring officeholders with certain pitfalls. It can be all too easy to enjoy the feeling of empowerment and let oneself be swept away by projects of self-aggrandizement as opposed to dedicating oneself fully to the task at hand. Like the revolutionary syndicalist and the Christian pacifist, Weber feels that the man who works in politics only to serve his own vanity is weak and unfit for the role. What, then, should be the goal of the politician’s constant struggle?

Weber lays out a platter of viable political ends with the only stipulation being that “some kind of belief must always be *present*,” but in his case at least, it is quite clear that devotion to Germany and its national interest is supreme.¹⁴ He goes as far as to open one of his political writings by plainly declaring that he has always viewed all politics from the national perspective.¹⁵ Raymond Aron saw a pattern in his political writings, in which there is a theoretical component with an analysis of the eternal, current, and personal conditions of political action (this section is full of antinomies such as means-ends, responsibility-conviction, etc.) and a historical component that consists of judgments of the concrete historical data.

We can detect two major areas of concern that pervade Weber’s political writings with respect to Germany’s national interest: the preparation of the ruling elite and the civilizing role of German culture. The first area is in domestic politics and is related to the problem of the power vacuum caused by Bismarck’s dismissal from politics in 1890 by Emperor Wilhelm II. Weber’s chief concern was that Bismarck, in pursuing policies of economic development and the first modern welfare state, had also inadvertently spared his citizens from having to worry about public affairs by hindering the power of the German parliament and creating a stifling bureaucracy that was the only force that could step in to govern after Bismarck’s departure.¹⁶ In effect, Bismarck had left behind a politically immature ruling class. In response, Weber called for a constitutional democracy that would allow men with the aforementioned prerequisite characteristics for political leadership to compete for office and use the bureaucratic entity as a means to govern (where hitherto it had been in the driver’s seat of policy-making). Nationalism was a force that could support a mass political party and transcend the useless parliamentary squabbling of the time. The fatherland was not just any old value among others, but rather one of the few serious (unlike the vain pursuit of power), non-illusory, this-worldly (unlike Christianity) political

goals to which one could devote oneself.¹⁷ In his impassioned fury, Weber sought out that charismatic *Übermensch* who would rescue Germany from Christian servility, revolutionary stupidity, and bureaucratic sterility.¹⁸

The second area concerns Germany's prestige in Europe. Max Weber seems to take it for granted that the international order is anarchic by nature and that relations between nations are a function of the nations' power. Indeed, as Aron remarks, the closest Weber ever comes to a sociology of international relations is in a few unfinished pages of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*.¹⁹ That the international order is characterized by power relations between nation-states is hardly a surprising conclusion for those of the realist school of international-relations theory. One might fancy Weber's pessimistic worldview as a type of realism; but Aron is right in reminding us that it is unrealistic to see the world not as it is but as one wants it to be, and therefore Weber's conception of a world shaped solely by savage power politics is just as far removed from reality as is the extreme idealist's view of the world.²⁰

Where Weber's conception of world politics sounds much more dated and indubitably *German* is in his emphasis on the uniqueness of German culture. The link between German grandeur and power and culture never seems very rigorously defined—we do not suspect that it would have demanded a thorough, theoretical treatment at the time. Power appears to be the means to German grandeur, which has less to do with the triumph of force than with the spreading of German culture. This propagation of German culture is made to be a moral imperative that the German nation *must* shoulder in its capacity as a *Machtstaat*. Germany is in turn a *Machtstaat* because it has 70 million people,²¹ and therefore it is saddled with the inescapable obligation to throw its weight into the balance (on behalf of its own people as well as the Danes, the Swiss, the Dutch, and the Norwegians) and prevent world power from being divided “between the regulations of Russian officials on the one hand and the conventions of English-speaking ‘society’ on the other, with perhaps a dash of Latin *raison* thrown in.”²²

Max Weber's political thought centers on nationalism, albeit a nationalism that transcends state borders and encompasses greater cultural or ethnic wholes. Aron also points out the liberal and imperialist currents in Weber's thinking.²³ As for the latter, he was not of the *mission civilisatrice* stripe, nor did he advocate geopolitical speculation or the plunder of far-off lands for the sole purpose of economic exploitation,²⁴ but he did have certain imperialist ambitions, such as maintaining military bases in locations as distant as Warsaw and having the German army occupy Liège and Namur for some twenty years.²⁵ As for the former, a brief look at Weber's liberal side might shed some light on the peculiarities of the German situation at the time.²⁶

Unlike liberalism elsewhere, in Germany, the liberal tradition was not rooted in metaphysics or natural law. Weber was a liberal in that he valued the individual as an autonomous cultural being, but he did not indulge the conceit of elevating this preference to the level of a universal principle. The rationalistic liberalism of the French Enlightenment and Revolution, bestowed upon all of humanity, was quite foreign to German sentiments. Similarly, English utilitarianism conflicted with Germany's conception of the role of the state, and so it should come as no

surprise that the latter rejected the negative liberty of the former in favor of positive liberty. Because principles in general were something of an embarrassment, German liberalism accepted the primacy of the pragmatism of power as a matter of fact and consequently admitted only a liberalism of *results*. Weber would not live long enough to see the destructive and nihilistic implications such a political position could have; Aron, by contrast, had direct experience of the outcome.

Whether it concerned Weber's stance on German domestic politics or his feelings with regard to Germany's position in Europe, he was steadfast in his loyalty to the German national interest alone, with everything else serving an instrumental purpose. It is for this reason that there is a conspicuous lack of ideological justification in Weber's political arguments.²⁷ Any ideological justification would have to rely on the unstable foundation of an arbitrary value whose very bias would diminish its scientific worth.²⁸ The problem with using German power and grandeur alone as the justification is interpreted brilliantly by Aron when he asks, "if the nation's power is the supreme value, regardless of the nation's culture, regardless of its leaders, regardless of the means employed, then on what grounds can one say *no* to what Max Weber would have rejected with horror?"²⁹

And this is perhaps the great tragic irony in Weber's position on world politics: he expected that Germany's acquisition of power would promote German culture and grandeur, though he never conceived of power in terms of national prosperity, for instance, instead of force of arms, and therefore he never thought that the naked pursuit of power could destroy the culture he desperately wished to defend.³⁰ This oversight is a consequence of a metaphysics rooted in struggle and conflict, at times Darwinian, at times Nietzschean.³¹

This vision of struggle penetrating every sphere of human activity pervades Weber's work, both political and scientific. Aron noticed that it was one of the great faults of the German thinker's impossible philosophy—whose foundation lay in his irrefutable methodology—that he never considered that one could reconcile one's conflicting values.³² Indeed, for all of his pontificating against the pacifists, there remains something curiously Christian about Weber's insistence that one must choose one's *god* (or demon, for that matter), and not one's *gods*.³³ Once a man has chosen his value, he must never waver in his devotion. This unwillingness to compromise is fitting for the seeker of truth, but not for the politician.

This would not be the last time that Aron would engage with Weber's mind on the ethics of conviction and responsibility. In two unpublished courses he gave at the Collège de France, Aron would explore the theory of political action; and this would lead him to reexamine the antinomies of conviction and responsibility, means and ends. It is to Aron's later meditation on Weber's work that we now turn.

Raymond Aron's Reinterpretation of Max Weber

In two courses taught by Aron in 1972–1973 and 1973–1974, respectively titled *Théorie de l'action politique* and *Jeux et enjeux de la politique*, two of his most original

texts on political theory in spite of their being unfinished, Raymond Aron returns to Weber's ideas and proceeds to a reinterpretation of the problem of political morality.³⁴ He begins by contrasting the approach of what a political theory of action might be, with an analysis from an aerial perspective of interstate relations or political regimes. The latter describe systems or constitutions, although not precisely in the legal but rather the sociological sense, as "sets of rules under which a certain state functions" both domestically and internationally.³⁵ But there is another approach to the political, which roughly corresponds to what we would call policy, which seeks to examine the action of individuals, or parties, or states, within those systems. Of this analysis of political behavior in a strategic sense, "employing a range of means in accordance with a certain plan," or to achieve certain ends, we can find models in Thucydides, Machiavelli or Clausewitz. It is this analysis that often appears in the form of advice to princes—how to win and how to succeed—and Aron calls it "praxeology" from *Paix et guerre* onward. Political action has restrictions of its own, and its own efficacy and internal logic.

In the first of these courses, Aron comments on the arguments found in Raymond Polin's book, *Ethique et politique*. In this work, his colleague at the Sorbonne argued that it was impossible to make separate judgments about means and ends, since all techniques—including political technique—do not in themselves have an intrinsic moral significance, and are a mere assemblage of methods to obtain a certain effect. A technique, as such, would be radically amoral if it were not part of a human action. A human action is always performed in view of certain ends, with which it forms a whole: "The use of a knife to cut meat is a technique; it acquires a moral significance only when the knife is handled by a butcher, a dinner-guest, a surgeon or a murderer." According to Aron, Polin errs in assuming that means cannot be evaluated both for their effectiveness and for their ethical significance.

Polin's approach is typical of moral consequentialism: human acts are not, intrinsically, good or bad; they acquire a moral value depending on the results and purposes sought. The author of the work further adds "the idea that there may be a moral opposition between means and ends comes from the same confusion; it is considered that a certain conduct may bring into play a purpose, or means, which is not in agreement with them." However, Polin does not help his case any by concluding that "there is no conflict between means and ends; there is just an opposition between two conceptions of moral education, two global conceptions of war," in the end, two *Weltanschauungen*.

Raymond Aron presents and criticizes this position. He defends the legitimacy of evaluating means in themselves, an evaluation very distinct from that of the legitimacy of the ends. It is true that the teleological calculation used implicitly in the political technique of men endowed with free will implies the assessment of possible effects. Aron gives an example, following the same line of reasoning as Polin: "Does the knife, or the use of a knife, have a moral meaning, an intrinsic moral value, when it is wielded by a soldier in the trenches? In other words: what order of violence is it morally legitimate to use in war?" In war, we are not just soldiers with a duty to overthrow the enemy; we also remain human

beings endowed with a sense of dignity and respect for others. Therefore, “even in war there is the question of judging what is non-human, inhuman, what we morally condemn, and what we do not morally condemn.” This is an issue that the political philosopher cannot ignore. Is it indeed the case that the ends justify the means? Even if the end is sublime, is it not the case that there might be a “fundamental contradiction between what we ultimately want to achieve and the means that we employ”?

Aron rejects two doctrines that he considers extreme. The first is that “of certain moralists—and Maritain at times seemed to think along these lines—who want to convince us that nothing good can ever come out of evil and that certain means, obnoxious in themselves, always corrupt action and are not conducive to achieving a valid end.”³⁶ The other extreme is “the cynicism which suggests that it is always the crueler or more radical means which are the most effective,” and this also seems misplaced to him. In the end, Raymond Aron departs decisively from Max Weber’s theory, explaining his previous hesitations and reservations. The distinction between the ethic of responsibility and the ethic of conviction led to numerous comments and had disturbed Aron for a long time because the distinction had never given him complete satisfaction. He came to feel the flaw was that Weber did not acknowledge that the ethic of conviction might incorporate both the absolute wish for certain ends, but also the absolute refusal to use certain means.

The starting point for Aron’s own examination of the relationship between morality and politics is instrumental thought. This instrumental thought is characteristic of transitive action: “what we use, even without thinking, when it is a question of achieving an end external to the action itself.”³⁷ What he is investigating is how a man of action evaluates his action, a man who wants to achieve certain ends and employs certain means. The question is twofold: on the one hand, how to define the purpose, and, on the other, which means one has the right to use.

According to Aron, the starting point for Max Weber is not the same, because for him the ends are immediately given in world history. In his second course, Aron explains his reinterpretation of Weber’s argument. This argument distinguishes between two types of ethics. The first is an “ethic of personal perfection,” with a universal and timeless meaning, “subject as little as possible to specific social institutions.” The second is an ethic “connected to the plurality of values,” the roots of which are “the problems of action in this world,” not any difficulty in determining the ends. The ends are written in activities themselves: the wise man seeks the truth, the artist beauty. Only in the political field is there a serious problem regarding the knowledge of values, or purposes, due to the “historical condition of man.” Can the ends be easily determined in politics? Even if they can, are the means that we employ in axiological agreement with these ends?

It is true that, apart from these intrinsic difficulties of the political order, Max Weber introduces a radical incompatibility between certain values, the contradiction between values, in which Aron does not believe and which does not seem essential to him. This opposition between the ethic of personal perfection

and the difficulties of political action “is a truism that we must often repeat, for the essence of the intellectual, humanist, and utopian is to refuse it,” and to build models in which an ideal society and the moral and political conduct of a person are in harmony. For Aron, there is no “pre-established harmony between the determinism of world history and desires for value”; that is, progress does not have to coincide with the good, and the trends of history do not imply the creation of a human ideal. Nevertheless, he strives to reconcile the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, as the opposition between them does not need to be radical. Thus, it is conviction that determines the choice of ends to which one is responsible.

Secondly, the ethic of conviction also implies the “unconditional refusal to employ certain means.” Since Weber often uses the aphorism “each person chooses his own god or demon,” he authorizes or at least suggests an interpretation of his philosophy as being a “decisionist or, to be strict, nihilistic” philosophy, in which “determining the purposes completely escapes rational argument,” and so the ends become a mere arbitrary choice. Raymond Aron chooses not to interpret Weber in this way. For him, above or beyond the political decision in terms of consequences, the German sociologist strives to preserve an ethical sphere, which in itself has its own reward and motivation.

Instead, in the lectures of these courses, Aron reviews the distinction between the two meanings of Weber’s ethics, a distinction rendered very mild and very different from the traditional distinction: on the one hand, “a morality that is simply defined by the Sermon on the Mount or Kantian morality,” to “obey the unconditional imperative of Christianity not to resort to violence,” to “obey the law out of respect for the law, without worrying about one’s own interest or worrying about the consequences”; and, on the other hand, a worldly examination of the consequences of action in the political realm: “If we want to, we can translate a morality of personal perfection into the language of means and ends, but I think that this would be a falsification of the psycho-moral meaning of ethical behavior; ethical conduct so conceived has no other purpose than to obey a divine imperative or a human law.”

Aron’s Review of Weber’s Ethical-Sociological Approach to Political Action

What does he want to retain from this analysis of Weber’s texts and theories? We do not need to guess, for Aron himself presents the ideas that are central to his own political philosophy. First of all, the “heterogeneity between instrumental rationality and axiological rationality”: that is, there exists a rationality of means that can be assessed on the basis of their fitness for the purpose, but means can also be evaluated in terms of moral standards. Nevertheless, this heterogeneity between efficacy and moral value should be corrected or limited by the axiological consequences of the choice of means.

Secondly, he asserts “the inevitable plurality of ends that can be proposed in the specifically political arena.” It is not certain that the least unfair society is invariably the most liberal one. For example, a city’s prosperity and justice cannot

always go hand-in-hand, and justice and the common good have many meanings in a society divided into rival groups. Perhaps this idea can be translated into what Isaiah Berlin calls the “uncombinability” or complexity of moral goods, transposed into the public domain. Finally, human ends are not always incompatible, nor are they a mere matter of preference, even if the idea of humanity underlying the “reconciliation of all the political ends that can be proposed in an ideal regime” is nothing but a regulatory idea, an idea of Reason in the Kantian sense.

The essence of politics thus consists of the tensions between the exigencies of the moment, the political morality that seeks to accommodate the citizens’ private moralities, and the statesman’s own private moralities (some of which are reconcilable with each other, some of which are not), that exist both within and between human beings. The great statesman is he who can navigate his way through this stormy sea of uncertainty—knowing full well that many of his decisions will leave him little-to-no time for reflection and therefore be based entirely on political knack—and arrive at the action that is, given the circumstances, the least detestable both for himself and for the collectivity.

In any case, both Raymond Aron and Max Weber were more *spectateurs engagés* than they were statesmen, even if they did possess Weber’s three aforementioned necessary qualities for politicians: passion, feeling of responsibility, and sense of proportion. Aron nevertheless doubted that his character was resilient enough to carry out some of the unpleasant but nevertheless necessary tasks that politicians must sometimes perform.³⁸ Weber knew that his inability to compromise made him a poor match for the political life.³⁹ He could never commit himself fully to his views grounded in power politics because he had a feeling of responsibility to values even greater than German grandeur. Aron, too, saw beyond the nation and was an early and ardent supporter of Franco-German reconciliation right after the war, when that was the last thing to be expected from a French Jew. In the war of the gods, and in spite of it all, they sided with liberty, nobility, and truth.

Notes

1. See Raymond Aron, *Mémoires: Edition intégrale inédite*, Paris, Editions Robert Laffont, 2010 [1983], 102.
2. See Franciszek Draus, “La philosophie sociale de Raymond Aron,” PhD diss., École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1981, 9.
3. Aron, *Mémoires*, 105–106.
4. See Raymond Aron, *La Sociologie allemande contemporaine*, Paris, Quadrige, 2007 [1935], 81. The relevant pages from this work are 82 and 102–110.
5. See Raymond Aron, *Les Étapes de la pensée sociologique*, Paris, Gallimard, 2011 [1967]), 21.
6. See Ibid., 315; Raymond Aron, “Max Weber and Modern Social Science,” trans. Charles Krance, in Franciszek Draus (ed.), *History, Truth, Liberty: Selected Writings of Raymond Aron*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1985, 336.
7. See Ralf Dahrendorf, afterword to *Politik als Beruf*, by Max Weber, Stuttgart, Reclam, 1992, 85–86, 89, 92–93.

8. Max Weber, "Politik als Beruf," in Johannes Winckelmann (ed.), *Gesammelte politische Schriften*, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Verlag, 1988 [1919], 506. The relevant pages from this work are 545–552 and 558–559.
9. See Aron, "Max Weber and Modern Social Science," 349–350.
10. See Aron, *Les Étapes*, 528.
11. See Raymond Aron, "Max Weber et la politique de puissance," in Raymond Aron, *Les Étapes de la pensée sociologique*, Paris, Gallimard, 654.
12. Max Weber, "The Profession and Vocation of Politics," in Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (eds.), *Weber: Political Writings*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000 [1994], 367.
13. See Hans Henrik Bruun, *Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology*, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2007 [1972], Loc. 7956, 7978, and 1407, Kindle.
14. Weber, "The Profession and Vocation of Politics," 355.
15. See Max Weber, "Deutschland unter den europäischen Weltmächten," in Johannes Winckelmann (ed.), *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Verlag, 1988 [1919], 157.
16. See Sven Eliaeson, "Constitutional Caesarism: Weber's politics in their German context," in Stephen Turner (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Weber*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 134–135; Tracy B. Strong, *Politics without Vision*, London, University of Chicago Press, 2012, 115; Max Weber, "Parlament und Regierung im neugeordneten Deutschland," in Johannes Winckelmann (ed.), *Gesammelte politische Schriften*, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Verlag, 1988 [1919], 311–320.
17. See Stephen Turner, introduction to *The Cambridge Companion to Weber*, 17.
18. See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, introduction to *From Max Weber*, by Max Weber, Oxon, Routledge, 2009 [1948], 43.
19. See Aron, "Max Weber et la politique de puissance," 645; Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie*, ed. Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 2009 [1921], 520–530.
20. See Aron, "Max Weber et la politique de puissance," 643.
21. See Weber, "Deutschland unter den europäischen Weltmächten," 176.
22. Max Weber, "Between Two Laws," in Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (eds.), *Weber: Political Writings*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000 [1994], 76.
23. See Aron, "Max Weber et la politique de puissance," 644.
24. See Paolo Armellini, "Max Weber: scienza e realismo politico," in Giovanni Dessì and Maria Pia Paternò (eds.), *Il realismo politico e la modernità*, Rome, Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2012 [2005], 71.
25. See Gerth and Mills, *From Max Weber*, 39.
26. See Eliaeson, "Constitutional Caesarism," 136–139.
27. See Aron, "Max Weber et la politique de puissance," 647.
28. See Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, ed. Johannes Winckelmann, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Verlag, 1988 [1922].
29. Aron, "Max Weber et la politique de puissance," 655.
30. See *Ibid.*, 656. For a contrasting view see Bruun, *Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology*, Loc. 1316.
31. See Aron, "Max Weber et la politique de puissance," 650; Max Weber, "Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik," in Johannes Winckelmann (ed.), *Gesammelte politische Schriften*, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Verlag, 1988 [1919], 14.

32. See Aron, "Max Weber and Modern Social Science," 371–372.
33. See Max Weber, "Wissenschaft als Beruf," in Johannes Winckelmann (ed.), *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) Verlag, 1988 [1919] 609; Carlo Antoni, *Dallo storicismo alla sociologia*, Firenze, G. C. Sansoni, 1940, 142–143.
34. Both texts are posthumous and only summaries by Aron, which were published in the *Collège de France Annuaire*, but the texts are at BNF, *Manuscrits*, NAF 28060 (024) and NAF 28060 (027).
35. See Raymond Aron, *Théorie de l'action politique*, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, *Manuscrits*, NAF 28060 (024), Leçon 1, fl. 2. The relevant sections of this course for the following discussion on Raymond Polin, *Ethique et politique*, Paris, Sirey, 1968, are Leçon 1, fls. 3–4, 12, Leçon 6, fls. 5–7, 10–11, 21–24, and Leçon 7, fl. 3.
36. Regarding the controversy with Maritain, see Raymond Aron, *Machiavel et les tyrannies modernes*, ed. Rémy Freymond, Paris, Éditions de Fallois, 1993, 367–378, 405–416. See also Serge Audier, *Machiavel, conflit et liberté*, Paris, Editions EHESS, 2005, 73–87.
37. Raymond Aron, *Jeux et enjeux de la politique*, BNF, *Manuscrits*, NAF 28060 (027) Leçon 2 from 15–01–1974, fl. 1. The relevant sections of this course for the remainder of this chapter are Leçon 3, fls. 5–9, 12–13, and Leçon 4, fls. 3–5, 9–10.
38. See Raymond Aron, *Le Spectateur engagé. Entretiens avec Jean-Louis Missika et Dominique Wolton*, Paris, Julliard, 1981, 303.
39. See Eliaeson, "Constitutional Caesarism," 131.