

The Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy—40 years later

Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2nd edn. Editor-in-Chief Donald M. Borchert. Macmillan Reference USA. Thomson Gale. Detroit/New York, etc. 2006. 10 Volumes

Eli Franco

Published online: 14 July 2007
© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Published in 1967, the eight-volume *Encyclopedia of Philosophy* edited by Paul Edwards was not only a description of what philosophy as a discipline covers. It was, as Peter Singer observed in Edward's obituary,¹ a kind of manifesto of Edwards' approach to philosophy. "He was a fervent advocate of clarity and rigor in philosophical argument, and he made sure that those he invited to contribute to the Encyclopedia shared these values. Some philosophers with big reputations, Edwards thought, were talking nonsense disguised as profundity, and he was delighted to be able to puncture those reputations. Argument and wit were his weapons. The existentialists made excellent targets, Heidegger foremost among them, and the articles on them and their ideas still make entertaining reading."

The Encyclopedia soon became a standard and authoritative work, at least for the English-speaking world, and remained so for decades. Only the recent publication of the *Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* (1998) may have become a serious threat to its dominance and influence. It is perhaps for this reason that Macmillan decided to issue a thoroughly revised second edition. The new editor, Donald M. Borchert, a professor at Ohio University, has a softer approach to philosophy, much to Edwards' chagrin, it seems. To quote again from Peter Singer: "When I visited Edwards in his New York apartment three years ago, he was distressed that the revisions

¹ Quoted in [wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Edwards_\(philosopher\)](http://wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Edwards_(philosopher)).

E. Franco (✉)
Institut fuer Indologie und Zentralasienwissenschaften,
Universitaet Leipzig, Burgstrasse 21,
04109, Leipzig, Germany
e-mail: franco@rz.uni_leipzig.de

had diluted the philosophical message and had been too gentle on a lot of postmodernist thought.”

Whatever the case may be, my intention here is not to compare the two editions of the encyclopedia—a task for which I have neither the time, nor the inclination, nor the competence—but to look at the specific area of Indian philosophy. This area was not well covered in the first edition, and one therefore expects things to have improved significantly in the revised edition. One of the troubles with the first edition was that Ninian Smart single-handedly covered practically the entire area of Indian philosophy. Those were obviously more optimistic times, when it was believed that a “specialist” of Indian philosophy could competently write on any subject within the entire field. To some extent, however, this must have been Smart’s own eagerness. In the area of Chinese philosophy, for instance, although many papers were written by the polymath Win tsit Chan, this did not result in a monoculture as in the case of the entries on Indian philosophy.

How was Indian philosophy divided into lemmas 40 years ago, and how did the editors proceed today? And how are 40 years of research reflected in this new second edition? These are the questions I will attempt to answer below.

To begin with, let us compare the lemmas and the scholars:

First Edition	Second Edition
<i>Area Editor:</i> Ninian Smart	<i>Area Editors:</i> Karl Potter for Indian Philosophy Richard Hayes for Buddhism
<i>Main entry</i> Indian Philosophy 4:155–169; 29 cols. N. Smart	<i>Main entry</i> Indian Philosophy 4:623–634; 22.5 cols.; Karl Potter Buddhism 1:721–726; 8.5 cols.; Richard Hayes
<i>Individual entries</i> Buddhism 1:416–420; 9 cols; N. Smart Hinduism 4:1–5; 9 cols; N. Smart Jainism 4:238–239; 4 cols; N. Smart Karma 4:325–326; 2 cols; N. Smart Logic, History of (Indian Logic) 4:520–523; 6.5 cols; J.F. Staal Mysticism (Indian Tradition) 5:420–422; 4 cols.; N. Smart Reincarnation 7:122–124; 3 cols.; N. Smart	<i>Individual entries</i> Atomic Theory in Indian Philosophy 1:380–383; 6 cols.; Roy Perrett Brahman 1:681–685; 8 cols.; Bina Gupta Buddhism, Schools Madhyamaka 1:740–746; 12.5 cols.; Mark Siderits Yogācāra 1:746–753; 12.5 cols.; Dan Lusthaus Buddhist Epistemology 1:753–758; 10 cols.; John Dunne

First Edition	Second Edition
Yoga 8:358; 2.5 cols; N. Smart ²	Causation in Indian Philosophy 2:109–113; 8 cols.; Brian Carr
<i>Indian Philosophers</i>	Karma 5:41–42; 2.5 cols; Ninian Smart
Aurobindo Ghose 1:208–209; 2 cols.; N. Smart	Knowledge in Indian Philosophy 5:115–123; 16 cols; Eli Franco
Iqbal, Muhammad 4:212–213; 3 cols; B.A. Dar	Logic and Inference in Indian Philosophy 5:410–414; 8 cols.; Brendan Gillon
Madhva 5:125–127; 3 cols.; N. Smart	Meditation in Indian Philosophy 6:107–110; 5 cols.; Christopher Chapple
Nagarjuna 5:439–440; 2 cols.; N. Smart	Mind and mental states in Buddhist Philosophy 6:253–258; 9 cols.; Frank Hoffman
Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli 7:62–63; 2 cols.; N. Smart	Negation in Indian Philosophy 6:530–533; 6.5 cols.; Birgit Kellner
Ramanuja 7:64–65; 3 cols.; N. Smart	Philosophy of Language in India 7:412–417; 10 cols.; George Cardona
Śankara 7:280–282; 5.5 cols.; N. Smart	Reincarnation 8:331–333; 5 cols; N. Smart
Tagore, Rabindranath 8:75–78; 2 cols. William Gerber	Self in Indian Philosophy 8:717–720; 6 cols.; Arvind Sharma
	Truth and Falsity in Indian Philosophy 9:542–546; 9 cols.; Stephen Phillips
	Universal Properties in Indian Philosophical Traditions 9:580–587; 14 cols.; Arindam Chakrabarti
	<i>Indian Philosophers</i>
	Iqbal, Muhammad 4:743–745; 4 cols.; B.A. Dar
	Nāgārjuna 6:469–472; 7 cols.; Jay Garfield
	Vasubandhu 9:659–653; 6 cols.; James Duerlinger

Obviously, the second edition has two major advantages over the first. The entries were written by a group of scholars—in fact, no two entries were written by the same scholar—, and the space allotted to Indian

² In addition the index mentions general articles in which Indian philosophy or religion are also treated, namely, “Aceticism,” in which, Indian asceticism is well represented in the historical parts, less so in the arguments for and against asceticism (1:171–174). “Pantheism” by Alasdair MacIntyre, which contains a section on Vedic Pantheism (6:32); “Pessimism and Optimism” by L.E. Loemker, which has half a column on Indian thought (6:115), and “Philosophy of religion, History of” by H.D. Lewis, which has 1.5 columns on Hinduism and one column on Buddhism (6:276–277). The index also refers to entries such as “Schopenhauer,” “Sufi Philosophy,” where Kabir is mentioned, “Teleological argument for the existence of God” (8:87), where Indian religious philosophy is said to regard the universe as resulting from the non-purposive manifestation of a non-personal absolute, “Wisdom,” with references to *Bhagavadgītā* and *Dhammapada* (8:322), but these entries are negligible for the field of Indian philosophy.

Perhaps of some interest are the philosophical journals that are referred to in the index: Vol. 6:208 mentions *Review of Philosophy and Religion* (Poona) and *The Aryan Path* (Bombay); vol. 6:213 mentions *Philosophy East and West* (Hawaii), the *Journal of the Philosophical Association* (Amraoti, later Nagpur), *Indian Philosophy and Culture* (Vrindaban) and *The Indian Journal of Philosophy* (Bombay).

philosophy has doubled, at least when one counts the columns (91.5 versus 196).³

When one considers the division into lemmas, some conspicuous characteristics of the revised edition can be immediately discerned:

- (1) Fewer individual philosophers receive an independent entry. This characteristic contrasts Indian philosophy not only with the treatment of Western philosophy, but also with the presentation of Indian philosophy in the first edition, where at least eight philosophers were considered important enough to be allotted separate entries. True, the choice is arbitrary, almost capricious: The sole Buddhist philosopher who was selected is Nāgārjuna; no Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā or Sāṃkhya philosopher were deemed worthy of an individual entry, and Vedānta (with Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva) is over-represented, as are philosophers of the 20th century at the expense of those from the 19 preceding ones. However, the decision in the second edition to assign independent entries only to Iqbal, Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu seems equally inappropriate.
- (2) No philosophical school receives an independent entry. Here at least an exception was made for the Buddhist schools Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, which succeeded to maintain a semi-independent existence within the larger entry “Buddhism-Schools,” next to Chan and Zen, the Dge Lugs tradition and Hua Yen Buddhism. The importance of “schools,” or philosophical traditions, in Indian philosophy cannot be overestimated, for it is often difficult, not to say impossible, to distinguish between what, in a given work, is the original philosophical contribution of the author and what has been taken over from various previous sources, written or oral, all the more so because a large part of the philosophical literature was written in the form of commentaries. In this respect the Routledge Encyclopedia is certainly better organized, as it contains many more entries and a more reasonable division into lemmas.⁴

³ This calculation is a bit misleading, for the pages are slightly larger in the first edition, where a column contains some 60 lines with ca. 8–9 words in a line, whereas in the second edition a column has some 50 lines with 9–10 words per line.

⁴ I found the following entries in the index of the Routledge Encyclopedia: Abhinavagupta; Ambedkar; Arya Samaj; Aurobindo Ghose; Bhartṛhari; Brahmo Samaj; Buddha; Buddhism; Buddhist philosophy, Indian; Dharmakīrti; Dignāga; Gadādhara; Gandhi; Gaṅgeśa; Hindu philosophy; Iqbal; Kauṭīlya; Mādḥava; Madhva; Mādhyamika Buddhism; Mahāvīra; Mysticism, history of; Indian mysticism; Nāgārjuna; Patañjali; Radhakrishnan; Ramakrishna Movement; Rāmānuja; Śaṅkara; Shah Wali Allah (Qutb al-Din Ahmad al-Rahim); Tagore; Udayana; Uddyotakara; Vallabhācārya; Vasubandhu; Vātsyāyana; Indian philosophy Indian and Tibetan philosophy; Abhidharmika

- However, the main entry by Karl Potter, which is rich in information and clearly written, addresses the philosophical schools individually.⁵
- (3) Buddhism receives a fairer treatment than Hinduism or Jainism, as it gets its own entry “Buddhism,” unlike the latter (which had their own entries in the first edition). Further, as mentioned above, two Indian Buddhist schools receive semi-independent entries, while no Hindu or Brahminical school is given the same honor. Moreover, there is a separate entry for Buddhist Epistemology, which recompensates to some extent the absence of an entry for the Buddhist Pramāṇa School.
 - (4) There is a strong emphasis on epistemology at the expense of metaphysics (ontology), ethics and soteriology. The entries “Atomism,” “Brahma” and “Self” are rather short, as are those on “Meditation,” “Karma” and “Reincarnation.” It is disconcerting that in spite of the availability of recent major studies on karma,⁶ Ninian Smart’s old articles were simply reprinted, all the more so because Smart introduced an infelicitous division between “karma” and “reincarnation”; it should have been clear to the editors that these two topics should not be treated separately.
 - (5) Indian philosophy in this Encyclopedia is largely an American product. With the exception of three scholars working in Europe (Brian Carr, Kellner and myself), all entries were written by American scholars, or scholars working in the U.S.

Before considering the individual entries, let me mention two regrettable deficiencies. First, the mistakes in the transliteration of Sanskrit words, and these in a baffling quantity. There is almost no article in which Sanskrit words and names are not misspelled; some of them are badly disfigured, almost beyond recognition (e.g., Viśiādvaita for Viśiṣṭādvaita in Sharma’s article,

Footnote 4 continued

schools of; Awareness in Indian thought; Brahman; Buddhism; Buddhist philosophy, Indian; Causation, Indian theories of; Negative facts in classical Indian philosophy; Cosmology and cosmogony, Indian theories of; Definition, Indian concepts of; Duty and virtue, Indian conceptions of; Emptiness, Buddhist concept of; Epistemology, Indian schools of; Error and illusion, Indian conceptions of; Fatalism, Indian; Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇavism; God, Indian conceptions of; Heaven, Indian conceptions of; Inference, Indian theories of; Interpretation, Indian theories of. Additional references to: Jainism; Jaina philosophy; Karma and rebirth, Indian conceptions of; Knowledge, Indian views of; Language, Indian theories of; Jaina theory of Manifolddness; Materialism, Indian school of; Matter, Indian conceptions of; Meaning, Indian theories of; Mīmāṃsā; Mind, Indian philosophy of; Momentariness, Buddhist doctrine of; Monism, Indian; Nirvana; Nominalism, Buddhist doctrine of; Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika; Ontology in Indian philosophy; Political philosophy, Indian; Potentiality, Indian theories of; Sāṃkhya; Self, Indian theories of; Suffering, Buddhist views of origination of; Testimony in Indian philosophy; Vedānta; Yogācāra School of Buddhism.

⁵ Potter divides Indian philosophy into eight schools (or nine, if one includes the Cārvāka): Buddhism, Jainism and six Hindu systems: (1) Sāṃkhya and Yoga, (2) Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, (3) Mīmāṃsā, (4) Vedānta, (5) Śaivas, and (6) Grammarians.

⁶ I am thinking above all of Halbfass’ major study, which covers the topic of karma from every possible angle (cf. W. Halbfass, *Karma und Wiedergeburt im indischen Denken*. Kreuzlingen/München 2000), but also of O’Flaherty’s collection of papers (*Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions*. Berkeley 1980), in which Potter himself participated, and J. Bronkhorst’s *Karma and Teleology. A problem and its solution in Indian philosophy*. Tokyo 2000.

YuktiSaṣṭika for *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* in Garfield's paper, Asaṇa for Asaṅga in Duerlinger's contribution, and so on). One may think that paying attention to diacritics in an Encyclopedia for the general public is overly pedantic, but this is certainly not so. Writing Sanskrit words with the wrong diacritics, or worse, with letters with diacritics dropped, is not different from, and not less discreditable than writing English words with spelling mistakes. As far as I can see, the Encyclopedia contains no spelling mistakes in Latin or Greek words; why should it be different for Sanskrit words? If a half-way competent proof-reading of the blue-print of the text was not available, it would have been better, as some authors did, not to use diacritics at all.

Second, the cross-references, or rather their lack, are remarkable. For instance, it took me some time to discover that there are entries for Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu; neither is mentioned in the general entries "Indian philosophy" or "Buddhism." Further, Nāgārjuna is not cross-referenced in the article "Madhyamaka," nor is Vasubandhu in the article "Yogācāra."

Now, coming to the individual entries, it is not surprising that they are of uneven quality. Some are of excellent quality, well written, very informative, and let the reader catch a glimpse of the salient points of their subject matter, but some are the opposite. As an example for the latter, I would point out Arvind Sharma's article, which is uninformed, displays little or no knowledge of primary sources, modern scholarship, or of the philosophical debates about the Self (*ātman*) that went on for centuries between Buddhist and Brahminical philosophers; it is also completely out of balance inasmuch as the discussion of the Vedānta notion of the Self alone is as long as the exposition of all the other philosophical schools taken together. Although it is probably not Sharma's fault, the paper is marred with spelling mistakes in Sanskrit words; I noted the following: *purua*, *saṣāra*, *prakti*, *mīmāsā*, *viśiādvaita*, *prāamaya* (for *prānamaya*), *svaprakāsa*, *śarira*, Sākhyā, *sūkma*, *kāraa-sarīra* (for *kāraṇa-śarīra*) and *moka* (each of these appearing in this form not only once, but at every single occurrence of the word).

Better in form, but not in content is Brian Carr's contribution "Causation in Indian Philosophy." Carr decided not to bother about diacritics, and wisely so, for at the rare occasions when he dares venture into this "intricate" area, he promptly gets things wrong (e.g., *sāmsara*, and consistently so). Of course, it may be of slight disadvantage in a paper on causation that one cannot tell whether *karana* stands for *kāraṇa* (cause) or *karana* (instrument, instrumental cause), but better no diacritics than wrong ones. One would probably figure out that, but not why, *prakrati* (always so) stands for *prakṛti*. It may not come as a surprise that Carr's presentation of the Indian theories of causation contains peculiar mistakes. For instance, Carr seems to believe that inherence (*samavāya*) is a symmetrical relation: if a inheres in b, then b inheres in a. Thus he says (p. 113, col. 1): "The cloth, for example, is said to inhere in the threads *as one in many*, one thing in many things; just as much as the threads are parts of the cloth *as many in one*." [italics in the original] And if the many threads are said to be *in* the cloth, one is not be surprised to see that Carr translates—and I'm afraid he is not alone in this—*samavāyikāraṇa* as "inherent

cause” rather than the other way round, i.e., the cause(s) in which the effect inheres. I have found it also a bit disconcerting that except for O’Flaherty, *The Rigveda* (1981), Carr has no publications in his bibliography after 1972.

Sooner or later, every encyclopedia or reference work inevitably becomes out of date. However, if an author does not use any literature that appeared in the last 30 years or so, then his/her entry is seriously out of date already at the time of publication. Moreover, in such cases one may also suspect that an author has not read the scholarly work on the subject for that long, and is simply rehashing his memories of youth. This problem does not concern only Carr’s odd contribution, but also Bina Gupta’s on Brahman, in which the latest study dates from 1981.

It is equally unfortunate when an author misses the most important studies on the subject matter he deals with. James Duerlinger begins his article with a presentation of the much-discussed theory of two Vasubandhus, without being aware, it seems, of Schmithausen’s crucial article on this subject published in *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques*, 1992. Schmithausen argued that some close parallels between the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and the *Triṃśikā*⁷ are not due to reliance on a third, common source, but rather indicate that the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* quotes from the *Triṃśikā*. The implication of this observation is that if there were two Vasubandhus, they would have been contemporaries. I will expand on this point in a short appendix below.

A problem that had to be faced by every contributor to this Encyclopedia is how to avoid one-sidedness. It is difficult, not to say impossible, to cover a given subject matter in all times and all schools of thought, especially in a vast and little-explored area like Indian philosophy, where reliable editions, translations and topical studies are few and far from covering the field as a whole. However, some of the articles are so limited in scope and one-sided, that one wonders. Thus, Bina Gupta has hardly anything to say on Brahma outside the Vedānta schools. Frank Hoffman, on the other hand, in his article “Mind and Mental State in Buddhist Philosophy,” does not go beyond the Pali Canon. (Among the peculiar points in this paper I noticed the strange translation of *citta* as “heart” and of *gandhabba* as “cupid.” And again, no diacritics.) Christopher Chapple’s article “Meditation in Indian Philosophy” is centered on the Yoga tradition and has practically nothing to say on Buddhism.⁸

A dilemma that authors of encyclopedia contributions sometimes have to face is whether they should present their own particular point of view or some kind of consensus to which the majority of the scholars in the field would subscribe. It goes without saying that nothing can be written from an absolutely objective perspective, that it is impossible, and in fact not even desir-

⁷ Oddly Duerlinger confuses the *Triṃśikākārikā* by Vasubandhu with the *Triṃśikākārikāvṛtti* by Sthiramati, attributing the latter to Vasubandhu himself (p. 652, col. 1); the source of confusion seems to be that Duerlinger does not know that *vṛtti* means “commentary.” Thus, he speaks (ibid.) of “Vasubandhu’s *Viṃśatikākārikāvṛtti* ... and Vasubandhu’s own commentary on it.”

⁸ Taking the context into account, the specialist, but not the general reader, for whom this volume is intended, would understand that *ia ta* stands for *iṣṭa*, and *prakṛtis* for *prakṛtis*.

able, to adopt the semblance of complete neutrality. Yet if someone knows that his opinions are rejected by the vast majority of scholars working in the field, it would not be too much to expect that he or she warns the unsuspecting reader that the opinions presented are contested, and that there are alternative points of view. Dan Lusthaus does not fulfill this expectation. In his article on Yogācāra, he repeats his eccentric view that “Vijñapti-mātra is not the denial of anything real outside an individual mind. Even *rūpa* (sensorial materiality) is accepted” (p. 784, col. 1). As far as I know, this unlikely interpretation is not shared by anyone else. Recently Schmithausen has published a detailed refutation of this point of view (cf. Schmithausen 2005). In contradistinction to Lusthaus’ approach, Mark Siderits’ instructive article on Madhyamaka emphasizes the rich varieties of interpretations that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy and Madhyamaka philosophy in general received during the last decades (Madhyamaka as Nihilism, Quietism, Mysticism, Skepticism, etc.).

Arindam Chakrabarty’s “Universal Properties in Indian Philosophical Traditions,” shows that it is possible to write clearly and interestingly, and to cover all salient points of a subject matter even within a relative small space. Chakrabarty begins his article with a discussion on the referent of words in the Grammarian tradition, classifies the central topics of debate taking into account not only the two main protagonists, the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists, but also Mīmāṃsā, Jainism and Vedānta, and marshals the arguments raised by the realists for the existence of universals (perception, the use of words, etc.); he explains the difference between genuine universals and “titular properties” (*upādhi*), discusses the knowability of universals, dwells on the Buddhist *apoha* theory and Dharmakīrti’s devastating critique of universals, sketches the mild nominalism of the Jainas, and concludes with contrasts with Western metaphysics. On the whole an excellent and engagingly written paper, and, *amazingly*, no mistakes in the transliteration of Sanskrit words. Apparently this is possible even in this Encyclopedia.

George Cardona’s article “Philosophy of Language in India,” is somewhat limited in scope, but in my eyes the most accomplished in this collection. Cardona begins with the Vedic speculations on words, sentences and meanings and dwells shortly on the pre-Paninian theories of meaning alluded to in the *Mahābhāṣya*. According to one view, verbs signify varieties of being (*bhāva*), according to another they signify particular actions (*kriyā*, *karman*). The canonical view, formulated by Bhartṛhari, is that whatever is spoken of as something to be brought to accomplishment is referred to as action by taking on a sequential status.

The Grammarians distinguish between mere sounds (such as the noise made by a drum) and speech sounds (such as vowels and consonants): these are the basic units, groups of which make words, and group of words larger meaningful units. This view appears in Kauṭilya’s *Arthaśāstra* and is attributed to Kātyāyana. Kātyāyana and Patañjali knew well that physical sounds do not occur simultaneously or in immediate succession. When the last sound of a word is pronounced, its first sound no longer exists. Two approaches were

taken to this issue, one involving memory, the other considering sounds not to be the actual signifiers, but only manifesting factors (*vyaññ*) of the actual signifiers called *sphoṭa*, of which several types are assumed: *vākyasphoṭa*, *padasphoṭa* and *varṇasphoṭa* (for meaningful elements smaller than words, such as affixes). Cardona notes that the notion of *vākyasphoṭa* goes back to Śabara's time, whom he dates in the second century; however, this dating is certainly wrong, as Śabara's *floruit* has long been established as the second half of the fifth century.

Cardona also discusses the Grammarians' distinction between a direct relation of word and its referent (*śakti*) and an indirect one (*lakṣaṇā*). The referents of words were assumed by some to refer to actual external things such as a horse, others considered them to be mental constructs (*vikalpa*), a view shared by the Buddhists. Still others assumed that words have a natural relation with their meanings, a fitness (*yogyatā*) to express them. Sentence meanings were considered by some, notably Bhartṛhari, to be indivisible (*akhaṇḍa*) units of communication. Some Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, did not recognize sentences as distinct meaningful units over and above the individual words. Next to the literal meaning, suggestive meanings (*vyañgya*, lit. "to be manifested") were recognized. For instance, a sentence such as "the sun has set" said by a go-between to a woman could mean that it is time to go to her lover; said by a servant to a Brahmin, it could mean that it is time to perform the evening prayer. One can only regret that Cardona's excellent article does not deliver all it promises (at least if one takes its title seriously). His masterful survey covers all the main philosophical topics in the Gram-marian tradition, but the philosophy of language in the philosophical "schools" properly speaking (Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Buddhism) is practically left outside its scope.

Obviously, I cannot present or discuss here, even very briefly, all the entries on Indian philosophy in these volumes. The above remarks should suffice to indicate that they are of unequal quality and value. However, in spite of its evident deficiencies, the present edition is certainly an improvement on the preceding one. Whether it is also surpassing the *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* is a different matter.

Appendix: On the theory of two Vasubandhus⁹

Schmithausen convincingly argued that some close parallels between the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* and the *Triṃśikā* are not due to reliance on a third, common source, but rather indicate that the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* quotes from the *Triṃśikā*. (Cf. Schmithausen, 1992) Now, the earliest extant Chinese translation of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* dates from 443 A.D. (an earlier translation dated 433 seems to be irretrievably lost). Probably out of deference to Frauwallner,

⁹ Except for a few minor changes, the following repeats a part of my preface, together with Karin Preisendanz, to a forthcoming reprint of Frauwallner 2007.

Schmithausen tried to play down the implications of his study for the dating of Vasubandhu, stating that his date has to be advanced by a few decades, “five or six, or even less.” However, this conclusion is too conservative. For it to be true, we have to assume that no more than ten years passed between the composition of the *Triṃśikā* and the *Laṅkāvatāra*, that no more than ten years passed between the composition of the *Laṅkāvatāra* and its translation into Chinese, and that the passage in question is a later addition and was absent in the recension that was translated into Chinese in 433. And even if all three assumptions were correct, we would have to advance Vasubandhu’s date by six decades, not by five or even less. If, on the other hand, we allow for a minimum of 20 years between the composition of the *Laṅkāvatāra* and its translation into Chinese, and a minimum of another 20 years between the composition of the two works, or assume that the passage in question is not a later interpolation, this means that Frauwallner’s dating of the Younger Vasubandhu, namely 400–480, has to be advanced by at least 60–80 years, because Vasubandhu is supposed to have died shortly after the composition of the *Triṃśikā*. If one accepts Frauwallner’s dating of the Older Vasubandhu to 320–380,¹⁰ this renders the two Vasubandhus almost contemporaries.

In the “Supplementary Notes” to his *Philosophie des Buddhismus*, 3rd edition, p. 425, Frauwallner considered that Schmithausen’s study of the Sautrāntika presuppositions in *Viṃśatikā* and *Triṃśikā* (Cf. Schmithausen 1967) supports his attribution of these two works to the Younger Vasubandhu. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Cf. Franco 1997, pp. 77–78), the fact that the *ālayavijñāna*, which presupposes the assumption of a multi-layered series of cognitions, is not mentioned in the *Viṃśatikā* cannot be understood as indicative of Vasubandhu’s acceptance of a single-layered series of cognitions. If we draw this conclusion, we would have to assume that Vasubandhu accepted the *ālayavijñāna* in his *Karmasiddhi*, rejected it in the *Viṃśatikā*, and again accepted it in the *Triṃśikā*. The assumption that the *Viṃśatikā* was composed before the *Karmasiddhi* would not solve this problem because it would imply that Vasubandhu accepted the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* in the *Viṃśatikā*, rejected it in the *Karmasiddhi*, and then accepted it again in the *Triṃśikā*. All this does not imply, of course, that Yaśomitra did not refer to another Vasubandhu in his commentary on the *Abhidharmakośa* with the expression “the old Vasubandhu” (*vrddhavasubandhu*). However, this Vasubandhu clearly was a Hīnayāna Ābhidharmika and there is nothing to connect him, as Frauwallner does (*op. cit.*, p. 21), with the brother of Asaṅga. As de La Vallée Poussin noted long before Frauwallner conceived his theory of two Vasubandhus: “C’est une hypothèse désespérée d’identifier le frère et le converti d’Asaṅga avec Vasubandhu l’Ancien.” (La Vallée Poussin, 1923–31, p. xxvii) To be sure, Frauwallner’s hypothesis of two Vasubandhus cannot

¹⁰ The assumption that this Vasubandhu lived only for 60 rather than 80 years is, of course, purely hypothetical and merely follows Frauwallner’s convention of attributing a lifespan of 60 years to those philosophers about the duration of whose lives nothing is known. Cf. his “Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic,” p. 129 (= *Kl. Schr.*, p. 851).

be definitively refuted at the moment, but there is less and less evidence in its favour.¹¹ The trouble with any such hypothesis is that it presupposes coherence and consistency in the ancient authors that one would not dream of assuming in our contemporaries. Imagine how many Voltaires, Diderots or Heines one could assume, had one not known that they had actually written all the works attributed to them.

References

- Franco, E. (1997). *Dharmakīrti on compassion and rebirth*. Wien.
- Frauwallner, E. (2007). *Philosophie des Buddhismus*. Motilal Banarsidass.
- Kritzer, R. (2005). *Vasubandhu and the Yogācārabhūmi. Yogācāra Elements in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
- La Vallée Poussin, L. de (1923–31). *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu* (Vol. I, Introduction). Brussels: Institute Belge des Hautes Études Chinoises [Reprint 1971].
- Schmithausen, L. (1967). Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in der Viṃśatikā and Triṃśikā. *WZKS*, 11, 109–136.
- Schmithausen, L. (1992). A note on Vasubandhu and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. *Asiatische Studien/Études Asiatiques*, XLVI. 1, 392–397.
- Schmithausen, L. (2005). *On the problem of the external world in the the Ch'eng wei shih lun*. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.

¹¹ For the most recent discussion, cf. Kritzer (2005, xxiiff). Kritzer's discussion has the ancillary merit of referring to Japanese scholarship on the subject; he points out that "[i]n general, Japanese scholars did not accept Frauwallner's theory." Kritzer himself, however, seems to endorse, or at least remains open about, the assumption of "the existence of other figures named Vasubandhu."