

ELI FRANCO

STUDIES IN THE TATTVOPAPLAVASIMHA

II. THE THEORY OF ERROR*

In a previous paper I tried to present Jayarāsi's critique of the criterion of truth.¹ I would now like to proceed with the different, but related problem of the theory of error.² At first sight, it would seem that a theory of error does not have much to do with a criterion of truth. The function of the criterion is to tell us when and where a true cognition occurs, and, by the same token, when it does not occur. If we take, for instance, the efficiency of the activity as a criterion of truth, we can conclude by its presence that a cognition is right, and by its absence that a cognition is wrong. The criterion does not have to tell us anything about the way in which a true or false cognition is produced. Apparently, therefore, a theory of error has nothing to do with the question as to whether this or that particular cognition is true or false. It should simply tell us, after we have determined with a criterion of truth that a cognition is wrong, what went wrong.

However, Indian philosophers did not formulate their theories of error innocently, for they saw clearly that a theory of error can have a limiting function: an explanation of errors in a particular way determines when and where errors are at all possible. Thus, a Mīmāṃsaka will formulate his theory of error in such a way that it could never be applied to the Veda, and a Naiyāyika will formulate his theory in such a way that at some stage of the analysis the existence of an external real object will have to be assumed.

The conflict with the Buddhists obliged the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas to defend the reality of the object.³ Every cognition had to have its counterpart in reality to which the cognition was not allowed to add any modification. The cognition was supposed to be absolutely transparent, passive as a mirror, and not in any way responsible for its content. That is why errors presented an embarrassing problem, for errors are one clear case in which the cognition's external object (*ālambana*), if it has one at all, cannot correspond to the cognition's content, i.e., to the object which appears in the cognition (*pratibhāta-viṣaya*).

Now, if errors were to be made an exception in which the cognition has an ideal object, or no object at all, then this would constitute a dangerous

precedent and a marvelous example for the Buddhist *nirālambanânumāna*:

All cognitions are without external object,
because they are cognitions,
just like an illusion.

This kind of inference will prove the unreality of the world. Therefore, the 'realist' philosophers had to account for errors in such a way that one would not be able to use erroneous cognitions as an example for the above inference.

With regard to this problem, the two most important Naiyāyikas are the Ācārya and the Vyākhyātṛ. They laid down the basic principles which all Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā philosophers up to the 9th century used in their theories of error, and they all (with the possible exception of Kumārila)⁴ can be affiliated to the schools of the one or the other.

The problem of the identity of these two Naiyāyikas, which occupied Indologists for several decades, was more or less solved with the publication of Cakradhara's *Nyāyamañjarigranthibhaṅga*. Commenting on *NM*, 62.15 Cakradhara says that the name *ācāryāḥ* applies to a group of commentators on Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika*, the first of which (*prabhṛti*) is the Rucikāra, whereas the name *vyākhyātaraḥ* applies to a group of commentators on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* the first of which is Pravara.⁵ The Rucikāra was identified by E. Steinkellner with Adhyayana[pāda].⁶ As for the name Pravara, it appears in no other text except the *NM*, which is perhaps a bit strange for such an important figure who was a founder of a school. For this reason, A. Wezler has suggested that Pravara is perhaps not a proper name, and that it may be used here to designate a Naiyāyika already known to us by a different name.⁷

The basic principle of the Ācārya theory of knowledge is that the object is not alone responsible for the cognition's content.⁸ There are other causal factors which play a role in determining the way in which the object is presented to consciousness. In other words, the cognition's content and the cognition's (external) object are not equivalent terms. For instance, the same object appears differently when perceived from different points in space. The difference in the cognition is not due to the object, for it remains the same; it is due to the difference in the causal complex. This general principle was naturally applied to the theory of error. Jayanta presents three Ācārya theories, the first of which runs as follows (*NM*, 226. 14–15):

*kaīścid ālambanam tasmin uktaṃ sūrya-marīcayāḥ/
nigūhita-nijākārāḥ salilākāra-dhāriṇaḥ||*

“By some [Ācāryas] the external object in the [case of a mirage of water] is taught to be the sun-rays, which are made to hide their own form, and carry the form of water.”

It is clear that according to this *śloka*, whatever happens when there is an error, happens outside. It states that the sun-rays carry the form of water, and not that the sun-rays are cognized as water. Schmithausen (p. 167) interprets the *śloka* as if error consists in a transformation of the object (*pariṇāma*). (Note that the word occurs neither in the *śloka*, nor in Jayanta's commentary upon it.) This may be true to some extent, but the word transformation cannot be used here without modifications. When we talk of a transformation of one thing into another, we usually mean that after the transformation takes place, the thing is no longer there in its original form. To use Padmapāda's examples, when the lotus bud is transformed into a flower, or the milk into curds, the bud or the milk no longer exist as bud or milk. But here we have a different case. The form of the sun-rays is hidden when they carry the form of water, but nevertheless it exists. The theory of error described by Padmapāda (cf. below) involves a real transformation of the object, but it cannot be identical with the one referred to by Jayanta. Following Schmithausen, I shall use the word transformation to designate this theory, but the above modification should be borne in mind.

Logically, the next step in this theory is to say that when we have an erroneous cognition, it is not the cognition which is at fault (for it apprehends the object as it is at the moment the cognition arises), but the object, for it is not the cognition which deviates from reality (*vyabhicārin*), but the object. The cognition is completely passive, therefore the object is wrong.

From Uddyotakara's criticism we learn that this step was actually taken (*NV* on *NS*, 1.1.4, pp. 113–114):

*kiṃ punar atra vyabhicāri kim artha āho jñānam iti. eke tāvad
varṇayanti – arthasya vyabhicāraḥ arthas tu tathā na bhavattīti,
tad-vyabhicārāt tad-viṣayaṃ jñānam api vyabhicārīty ucyate iti.*

“In the case [of error], what deviates [from reality], is it the object (*artha*) or the cognition? Some [Naiyāyikas]⁹ are of the opinion that the object deviates, it is the object which is not so (*tathā*) [as it really is]; because it deviates, the cognition which has it for object (*viṣaya*) is also called ‘deviating’.”

No matter how shocking this theory may sound to us (for we say that a

wrong, false, invalid and so on object is a categorical mistake like a singing number; only cognitions can be right or wrong, objects can exist or not exist), its historical authenticity cannot be denied, for it was repeatedly attacked by Indian philosophers, Buddhists, Vedāntins and, as we have seen, by Naiyāyikas as well.

From Jayarāṣi's criticism we learn that the followers of this theory accepted a further logical consequence and applied the *bādhya-bādhaka-bhāva*, the sublated-sublating relation, to the different states of the object. Here again, one usually talks of sublation as a relation between two cognitions: the cognition of the sun-rays sublates the previous cognition of water, the cognition of the conch-shell sublates the cognition of silver etc. None of these cognitions affects the external object in any way. The conch-shell was exactly the same when we took it erroneously for silver, and it does not change now when we recognize it as a conch-shell. However, this Ācārya theory implies the opposite view. Indeed, once the object was recognized to be wrong, there is no reason why it should not be sublated. But perhaps the theory is less strange than it appears. The word *bādhā* is usually used in the strict sense of 'assertion of falsity' (*mithyēti bādhakam jñānam*), but it can also be used in a more general sense of 'obstruction'. In this second meaning it is certainly not restricted to the epistemological level, and it can be used as an ontological term. For instance, the subtlety (*saukṣmya*) of an object may prevent its being rightly apprehended.

Sublation is the exact opposite of error, i.e. a corrective process. Now, if the object undergoes an abnormal transformation in the case of error, then by sublation there should be a back-to-normal transformation: the object gives up the form which did not really belong to it, and takes its own form back. Padmapāda brings up in his *Pañcapādikā* two models for the transformation of the object. The first is the simple transformation of milk into curds (*kṣīrasya dadhi-pariṇāmaḥ*), but the analogy soon breaks down, because the curd is not transformed back into milk, whereas the silver is transformed back into a conch-shell when the sublating cognition arises. Therefore, the *pūrvapakṣin* gives another example, which can account for the transformation in both directions: the lotus bud (*kamala-mukula*) which bursts into bloom (*vikāśa*). The sun glow (*tejas*) is the cause of the lotus bursting into bloom, because when the sun disappears the flower turns into a bud again (*mukulībhāva*). In the same manner, as long as the defect (*doṣa*) is present, the abnormal transformation persists, but when the defect disappears, the object takes its own form again.¹⁰

We can turn now to Jayarāṣi's criticism of the transformation theory. His refutation contains three *vikalpas*: (1) the object sublates itself, (2) the object is sublated by another thing, (3) the object is sublated by a cognition. If a rapprochement is to be made between these *vikalpas* and the examples given by Padmapāda, it seems that the first *vikalpa* fits the example of the milk, and the second the example of the lotus bud. As for the third *vikalpa*, it is no longer specific to the transformation theory and in the last set of arguments the difference between the object-sublation theory and the cognition-sublation theory seems to disappear. The arguments are equally applicable to the sublation of cognition, and they are in fact, repeated by Jayarāṣi in this connection (cf. *TUS* p. 16.8--9).

The basic idea behind the arguments against the first two *vikalpas* is that if the object undergoes a real transformation, its apprehension, viz. the sublated cognition, cannot be false. The third *vikalpa* is a bit surprising. One could expect Jayarāṣi to argue that a cognition cannot sublate an existent object, instead he simply states that each cognition affirms the reality of its own object, and cannot be related to the object of another cognition. *TUS* pp. 14.25--16.2:

*yady arthasya bādhā, sa kena bādhyate? kiṃ svayam eva
ātmanam bādhyate, āho arthāntareṇa, jñānena vā? yadi svayam eva
ātmanam bādhyate, tadā bādhā tena kriyate jñāpyate vā? yadi
kriyate, avyatiriktā vyatiriktā vā? yady avyatiriktā, tadā bādhā
kriyate ity ātmānenotpādyate. tac ca na jāghaṭīti svātmani
kriyā-virodhāt. atha vyatiriktā kriyate, tathāpi vidyamānasya
kartṛtvam na pratīyamānasyāpalāpah. atha bādhā jñāpyate,
sāpy abhinnā bhinnā vā? yady abhinnā, tadā bādhā tena jñāpyate,
kim uktaṃ bhavati? udakam jñāpyate. atha bhinnā, tadā vidya-
mānasya jñāpakatvam siddham pratīyamānasya cāstitvam.
athārthāntareṇa bādhyate, tathāpi vidyamānāyor bādhya-
bādhaka-bhāvo bhūpālayor iva, na caikasya bādhya-bādhaka-
bhāva upapadyate. bādhāpi tena pratīyamānasya kiṃ kriyate
jñāpyate vā? yadi kriyate, avyatiriktā vyatiriktā vā? yady
avyatiriktā tadāvyatiriktā bādhā utpādyate, kim uktaṃ bhavet?
udakam utpādyate. tad-utpādane ca tat-samvīdo 'mithyātvam.
atha vyatiriktōtpādyate, tathāpi toyasambandhitayōpalabdher
ambhasa upapattir, na jātu devadattasyāsattve tan-nayana-*

vyavahāra-siddhiḥ. atha jñāpyate sāvyatiriktā vyatiriktā vā? yady avyatiriktā jñāpyate, tadā bādhā tena jñāpyate, kim uktaṁ bhavati? udakaṁ jñāpyate. atha vyatiriktā satī jñāpyate, tathāpy udakasyēyaṁ bādhēty anya-tantratayā pratibhāsanāt nātyantābhā-vôpapatih. tasmād arthāntareṇāpi na bādhôpapatih atha jñānena bādhyate, kim tad-viṣayeṇa, anya-viṣayeṇa, nirviṣayeṇa vā? yadi tad-viṣayeṇa, tadā tat-svarūpaṁ vidhatte na tu viparyāsa-yati tad-ākāra-paryavasita-rūpatvāt. athānya-viṣayaṁ bādhakam, tad api na yujyate, yad yad-viṣayaṁ tat tasyaiva sattām vidhatte na tv anyasya vidhāyakam pratiṣedhakam vā. svaviṣaya-paryavasāyinyo hi buddhayaḥ. atha nirviṣayeṇa bādhyate, na kiñcid vidadhāti prati-ṣedhati vā nirviṣayatvād eva.

“If the external object (*artha*) is sublated, is it sublated by itself, by another object, or by a cognition? If it sublates itself, is the sublation produced by it or is it made known? If [the sublation] is produced, is it [produced as something] different [from the object], or not? If it is [produced as] non-different, then [to say:] the sublation is produced [means the object] itself is produced by it (i.e., by the object). And this is totally impossible, because action upon oneself is contradictory (*svātmani kriyā-virodhāt*).¹¹ If [the sublation] is produced as different [from the object], even so, [only] an existent thing [can function as] an agent [of production] (*karṭṛ*), [and therefore,] there is no denial of what is perceived.

If the sublation is made known [by the object itself], once again [we ask:] is it different [from the object] or not? If it is [made known as] non-different, then [to say] the sublation is made known by it (i.e., by the object), what does it mean? [It would mean that] the water is made known! If [the sublation is made known as] different [from the object], then [only] an existent thing can make [something] known, and [,therefore,] the perceived [water] exists.

If [the object] is sublated by another object, even so, [both objects will exist, for] the sublated-sublating relation [obtains] between two existent things, just like between two kings, for the sublated-sublating relation is not possible with reference to one thing alone.

The sublation of the perceived [object], in its turn, is it produced by it (i.e., by the other object) or is it made known? If it is produced, is it [produced as] different [from the perceived object] or not? If it is not

different, then [to say] the sublation is produced as non-different [from the object], what would it mean? The water is produced! And if it is produced, its cognition is not false. If [the sublation] is produced as different [from the object], even so [the existence of] the water is established, because [the sublation] is apprehended as related to the water, [for] when Devadatta does not exist, one cannot talk about his eyes. If [the sublation of the perceived object] is made known [by the other object], is it [made known as] different [from the perceived object] or not? If [the sublation] is made known as non-different [from the perceived object], then [to say] the sublation is made known by it (i.e. by the other object), what does it mean? The water is made known! If [the sublation] is made known as different [from the perceived object], even so, the absolute inexistence [of water] is not established, because [the cognition] 'this is the sublation of water', appears as dependent on/in relation to something else (i.e. water). That is why the sublation is not established by another object either.

If [the object] is sublated by a cognition, is it [sublated] by [the cognition] which has it for its object, by [a cognition] which has another object, or by [a cognition] which has no object? If [the object is sublated] by [the cognition] which has it for its object, then this [cognition] affirms [the reality of] its form (i.e., the form of the object), it does not overthrow [it], because [the cognition] has a form which terminates in (i.e., conveys no other information than) the form of its [object]. If [a cognition] which has another object is the sublating [cognition], this is also not correct: whatever [a cognition] has for its object, it affirms the existence of that very [object], but it neither affirms nor negates [the existence of] another object. For cognitions terminate in their own objects. If [the object] is sublated by [a cognition] which has no object, [this is not correct. for a cognition without an object] neither affirms nor negates anything, precisely because it has no object!"

This ultra-realistic Ācārya theory referred to by Uddyotakara and Jayanta and criticized by Jayaraśi looks archaic, and Schmithausen (p. 168–9) already raised some doubts whether, in spite of Jayanta's testimony, it should be attributed to the Ācārya. I am inclined to believe that it was not originally developed by the Ācārya, because the basic principle of the Ācārya school is that the object is not the only causal factor which determines the cognition's content, whereas this theory implies the opposite view, and, in so far, it is much closer to the Vyākhyātṛ theory (cf. below). Therefore, what suggests itself is the assumption that it was only adopted by one of

the Ācāryas, who found in the above *śloka* a ready-made formula and interpreted it according to his own theory. The reason for such a supposition is that the explanation of the *śloka* given by Jayanta presents a completely different picture (*NM* p. 227.1–5):

*tatra tarāṅgādi-sāmānya-dharma-grahṇe sati na sthāṇu-puruṣavad
ubhaya-viśeṣāḥ smaraṇa-patham avataranti. na ca sannihita-
marīci-viśeṣāḥ smaraṇa-patham avataranti. kiṃ tu pūrvōpalabdha-
viruddha-salila-vartino viśeṣāḥ. tat-smaraṇāc ca sthagiteṣu
svaviśeṣeṣu marīcayāḥ svarūpam upadarśayitum aśaknuvantaḥ
toya-rūpeṇābhāsante.*

“There (i.e., in the case of a mirage) when common properties [of sun-rays and water like] waves etc. are apprehended, unlike [in the case of doubtful cognition in the form] ‘[Is it] a trunk or a man?’ the particular properties of both objects are not remembered. For¹² the particular properties of the sun-rays [which are found] in proximity are not remembered, but [only] the particular properties which occur in water which was previously perceived and which stands in contradiction [with the sun-rays]. And the sun-rays, unable to reveal their nature when their own particular properties are concealed because of the remembrance of these (i.e. the particular properties of water), appear in the form of water.”

It is clear that in this theory the explanation of error is based on the model of doubt. In both cases one perceives properties common to two (or more) objects, but in the case of doubt one is aware that the information at hand does not permit the determination which of the two objects is present, because one remembers that the perceived common properties apply equally to both objects. In the case of a wrong cognition, on the other hand, the cognitive process is disturbed: one remembers the particular properties of only one of the two objects, and jumps into the wrong conclusion. The resulting content of the erroneous cognition seems to be a mixture of general properties accurately perceived which are produced by the external object (*ālambana*), and particular properties produced by traces or impressions (*samskāra*) left by past experience.

This is where the theory ran into trouble. It could not explain how in one and the same cognition elements produced by both sense organ and memory intermingled, and, nevertheless, claim that the form of the sun-rays remains hidden. Moreover, the Naiyāyikas considered the mind (*manas*) an

atomic entity, and, therefore, it could not be in contact with both impression and sense organ at the same time. [Prabhākara, faced with somewhat the same problem, had to split the erroneous cognition into two different cognitions, the one produced by perception, the other by memory.]¹³

The arguments of Jayarāsi against this modified Ācārya-theory are quite clear, and do not need any further explanation. His main point is that since in the case of a mirage there is no awareness of the sun-rays, there is no justification for the assumption that they appear in the cognition. *TUS* p. 12.17–26:

*atha udakākāratayā marīcaya eva pratīyante, sa udakākāro
marīcibhyo vyatirikto 'vyatirikto vā? tad yady avyatirikto, sa tāttviko
'tāttviko vā? yadi tāttviko, katham tad-avagater mithyātvam?
athātāttviko, tadā marīcīnām apy atāttvikatvaṃ prasajyate.
atāttvikôdaka-tādātmye sati tad udaka-jñānam atathyam, kim
uktaṃ bhavati? marīci-vijñānam atathyam. ekasmimś cōdakākāre
pratīyamāne kenaitad ākhyātam, marīcayaḥ pratibhānti devānām-
priyasya. atha arthāntara-bhūtaḥ, tarhi na vaktavyaṃ marīcaya
udakākāratayā pratīyante, udakākārāntaritā marīcayaḥ.*

“If the sun-rays are cognized as having the form of water, is the form of water different from the sun-rays or not? If it is not different, is it real or not? If it is real, why is its apprehension false? If it is not real, then the sun-rays too would not be real. When [the sun-rays are] identical with unreal water, then [to say] this cognition of water is false, what does it mean? The cognition of sun-rays is false! And when the form of water alone is perceived, who told [you], the beloved of the Gods (i.e., the fool), that the sun-rays appear [in the cognition of water]? If [the form of water] is different [from the sun-rays], then [you] should not say that the sun-rays are cognized as having the form of water, [because in this case] the sun-rays are made to disappear (or perhaps: are excluded) by the form of water.”

The advantage of the Ācārya theory, both in what we called its archaic and modified forms, is that it renders the external object a necessary causal factor for every cognition, even an erroneous one. By that it achieves its purpose of destroying the example of the *nirālambanānumāna*.

Its disadvantage, for which it was severely criticised by the Vyākhyāṭṣ, is that it can explain only errors with an external object. It has no explanatory

power for errors without an external object such as the *keṣaṇḍuka* cognition.

Jayarāṣi does not fail to criticise this point (*TUS* pp. 12.26–13.5, cf. below), and argues that if falsity is defined as the appearance or the apprehension of an object (*avabhāta-* or *pratīyamāna- [viṣaya]*) different from the cognition's external object (*ālambana*), then errors like the *keṣaṇḍuka* cognition will not be false, because they do not have any external object to be different from. This argument can be applied to both the archaic and the modified forms of the Ācārya theory. However, the most important difference between the two is that the modified theory brings back both validity and falsity from the realm of external objects to the realm of cognitions. Jayarāṣi who, as we saw (*TUS* p. 15.24–26), does not allow any cognition to affect the object of another cognition, argues further as follows (*TUS* p. 16.3–9):

atha jñānaṃ bādhyate, tasyāpi bādhā kā? kiṃ svarūpa-vyāvṛtti-rūpā, svarūpāpahnava-rūpā, viṣayāpahāra-lakṣaṇā yā?
tad yadi svarūpa-vyāvṛtti-rūpā bādhā, tadā sarvaṃ bādhitam
syāt, vijñānasya vijñānāntareṇa nivartyamānatvāt. atha
svaṇṛpāpahnava-rūpā, tad ayuktam, mithyōdaka-vijñānasyāpy
anubhūyamānatvāt. atha viṣayāpahāra-lakṣaṇā bādhā ucyate,
sāpi na yuktā. yathā ca viṣayāpahāro na śakyate kartuṃ
tathānantaram eva niveditam.

“If the cognition is sublated, what is its sublation? Does it consist in the secession of [the sublated cognition] itself, or does it consist in denying [the sublated cognition] itself, or is it characterised by removing the object [of the sublated cognition]? Among these [alternatives], if the sublation consists in the destruction of [the sublated cognition] itself, then every [cognition] would be sublated, because [every] cognition is brought to an end by another cognition.¹⁴ If it consists in denying [the existence of the sublated cognition] itself, this is not correct, because false cognition of water too is experienced. If sublation is said to be characterised by removing the object, this is also not correct. It was just shown (cf. 15.22–16.2 translated above) that/why the removing of the object cannot be done.”

Jayanta is aware of the arguments raised by Jayarāṣi. (It is difficult to determine whether he has the *TUS* in mind or another work in which similar objections were raised.) However, he does not really explain how the removing

of the object is done. All he says is that this is the way the cognition is produced, i.e., he refers to the empirical fact that the cognition of a conch-shell sublates the previous cognition of silver. This amounts, of course, to the acknowledgement that he could not propose any satisfying explanation. *NM* p. 476.4–15:

*viṣayāpahāras tāvad astu bādhaḥ. viṣayasya ca na pratibhātatvam
apahniyate, kiṃ tu pratibhātasattvaṃ khyāpyata ity apahārārthaḥ.
asattvaṃ api nēdānīm upanatasya khyāpyate, yena pūrva-dṛṣṭa-
drughaṇa-bhagna-kumbhābhāva-pratibhāsavad abādhaḥ syāt.
na ca tadānīm apy abhāva-graḥaṇe vastuno dvy-ātmakatvaṃ
āsaṅkanīyam; pūrvāvagatākārōpamarda-dvāreṇa bādha-
pratyayōtpādāt: yan mayā tadā rajatam iti grhītaṃ tad rajatam
na bhavati, anyad eva tad vastv iti. nanu sva-kāla-niyatatvāt
jñānānām katham uttarasya jñānasya pūrva-jñānōtpāda-
kālavacchinna-tad-viṣayābhāva-graḥaṇa-sāmarthyam? kiṃ
kurmaḥ? tathā pratyayōtpādāt. na bhagna-ghaṭavad idānīm
tan-nāstitā grhyate, api tu tadaiva tad asat iti pratītiḥ.*

“Let the removing of the object, to begin with, be the sublation. And it is not the fact that the object appeared [in the sublated cognition] which is denied, but the inexistence of the object which appeared [in it] is proclaimed; this is what is meant by removing. Nor is it asserted that the experienced [object] does not exist now (i.e. at the time of the sublating cognition), for this would not be a sublation, just like the appearance of the inexistence of a previously perceived not which was destroyed by a wooden mace. And it should not be suspected that when the inexistence [of the object] is apprehended even in respect to that time (i.e. at the time of the sublated cognition), the object has a double nature (i.e. existent and inexistent),¹⁵ because the production of the sublating cognition involves the destruction of the previously perceived form: ‘what was perceived by me at that time as silver, that is (was) not silver, it is something else’.

– Since cognitions are restricted to their own time, how can a later cognition apprehend the inexistence of the object of a [previous cognition] which is delimited by the time of production of [that] previous cognition?

– What [can] we do since the cognition is thus produced? Unlike [the case of] the destroyed pot, the inexistence of that [silver] is not apprehended

now (i.e., with reference to the present), on the contrary, the cognition [arises with the form] ‘at that time it did not exist’.”¹⁶

We can turn now to the third Ācārya theory (for the second, cf. below) which may be considered as a modified version of the modified version of the first. Schmithausen (p. 249) considers it to be a post-Maṇḍana theory, but the fact that it was already criticised by Jayarāṣi, who could not have lived much later than Maṇḍana and may even be assigned to an earlier date, indicates the possibility of the opposite assumption. This theory was probably the most up-to-date of Jayarāṣi’s time. In trying to follow the probable historical order, I was obliged to break the structure of Jayarāṣi’s arguments. In fact, he starts his refutation of falsity with this third Ācārya-theory which is formulated by Jayanta as follows (*NM* p. 228.2–3):

*anyad ālambanaṃ cānyat pratibhātīti kecana/
ālambanaṃ dīdhitayas toyaṃ ca pratibhāsate//*

“Some [Ācāryas say:] ‘one thing is the external object, and another thing appears [in the cognition]; the sun-rays are the external object and the water appears’.”

In this definition the limited role played by the object in determining the cognition’s content becomes even clearer: an erroneous cognition is no longer attributing the right (general) properties to the wrong property-possessor. The object of cognition, viz. what appears in the cognition, is completely different from its external object. To illustrate the difference between the two theories, we can take the example of the conch-shell mistaken for silver. According to the modified form of the first Ācārya theory, the general properties of conch-shell appear in the cognition of silver: but according to the third theory, what appears in the cognition is simply silver – the properties and the property-possessor.

Note, however, that the role of the external object as a necessary causal factor of erroneous cognition has been retained, because it is the conch-shell that causes the recollection of silver (due to a similarity (*sādṛśya*) to silver, or to a disturbance (*doṣa*) of the sense organ). The fact that the conch-shell was considered the external object of the cognition, although it does not appear in it at all, compelled the Naiyāyikas to redefine the concept of *ālambana*. We shall deal with one of these new definitions later on, but first, in order to keep in pace with Jayarāṣi, let us reproduce his arguments against the third Ācārya theory (*TUS* p. 12.6–16):

*ko 'yam ālambanārtho nāma yenēdam udghuṣyate anyad
 ālambanam cānyat pratibhātīti? kiṃ vijñāna-janakatvam,
 ākārārpakatvam, vijñānādhikaraṇatvam, vijñānāvabhāsitatā
 vā? tad yadi vijñāna-janakatvan ālambanārthaḥ, tadā nayanālokāder
 apy ālambanatvaṃ prasajyate. athākārārpakatvam ālambanatvam,
 tad ayuktam, naiyāyika-samaye 'nabhyupagamāt. yathā ca
 viṣayākāro vijñāne na yujyate tathōpariṣṭāt pratipādayiṣyāmaḥ.
 atha vijñānādhikaraṇatvam ālambanatvam, [na,] na marīci-
 cakrōtkalitam udīyate jñānam, api tv ātma-samavetam ātmānam
 āśādayate. atha vijñānāvabhāsitatā ālambanatvam, tadā udaka-
 vijñāne udakaṃ pratiyate na marīcayāḥ.*

“What does it mean [to be] what one calls external object, by virtue of which it is proclaimed: ‘one thing is the external object, and another thing appears’? Is it the fact that [the external object] produces the cognition, or the fact that it provides the form [of the cognition], or the fact that it is the locus of the cognition, or the fact that it appears in the cognition?

Among these [possibilities], if what is meant by external object is the fact that it produces the cognition, then the eye, the light etc., too would be external object. If to be external object consists in providing the form [of the cognition], this is not correct, because it is not accepted in the established doctrine (*samaya*) of the Naiyāyikas, and we shall show later on (cf. *TUS* pp. 52.15–53.3) that the form of the object cannot [appear] in a cognition. If being external object consists in being the locus of cognition, [this is not correct, for] the cognition does not arise as appearing in a multitude of sun-rays, but [on the contrary] it arises as inhering the soul. If being external object consists in appearing in the cognition, then [this is not correct, for] in the cognition of water, water is perceived, not the sun-rays.”

It is clear from the above arguments that none of these definitions could apply to the third Ācārya theory which maintains that the external object does not appear in the cognition at all. The only characteristic which was retained from the older definitions of *ālambana*, viz. a causal factor of cognition, was too general to be used as the only definiens. Therefore, a new definition was required which had to fulfil the following three conditions: (1) the object does not have to appear in the cognition, (2) it has to be a causal factor of the cognition, (3) it has to be differentiated from other

causal factors. Several definitions were proposed,¹⁷ and I do not know whether the Naiyāyikas ever reached an agreement on any of them. These definitions however, represent a later stage of development, and were unknown to Jayarāṣi. The definition of *ālambana* referred to in the *TUS* (p. 13.6–7), in which the object is defined as the thing found in proximity, probably represents an intermediary stage of development, i.e., one after the formulation of the third Ācārya theory, but before the definitions of *ālambana* that appear in the *NM*.

This definition must have been formulated rather hastily, immediately after the definition of falsity as ‘one thing is the object and another thing appears in the cognition’, for it is so ‘busy’ defining an object which does not appear in the cognition, that it ‘forgets’ to mention that the object has to be a causal factor of the cognition. As it stands, it is certainly too broad (*ativyāpti*), for it can include anything found in proximity.

Jayanta rejects this definition, possibly because of the following criticism made by Jayarāṣi (*TUS* p. 13.6–12):

*yad apy uktam: marīci-deśaṃ prati gamanāt marīcīnām
ālambanatvam, yady evaṃ deśasyāpy ālambanatvam anayā
rītyā upapadyate. na cāvabhātōdaka-bhinnārtha-sannikarṣa-
jatvam udaka-vijñānasya upapadyate, satyōdaka-jñāne ‘drṣṭatvāt,
anyathānumeya-dahana-jñānasyāpy indriyārtha-sannikarṣa-
jatvam āpanīpadyeta ātma-manah-sannikarṣa-jatvāt. atha
pratīyamāna-dahanena saha manaso nāsti sambandhaḥ tad ihāpi
pratīyamānenāmbhasā saha nāsti sambandhaḥ cakṣuṣaḥ.*

“It is said: the sun-rays are the external object [of the cognition of water], because one goes towards the place of the sun-rays. If [this is] so, by the same way (i.e., by the same reasoning) the place too is (i.e. can be) established as the external object. And the production by contact with a thing different from the water which appeared [in the cognition] is not established for [the false] cognition of water, because this is not observed [in the case of] a true cognition of water. Otherwise, the cognition of the inferred fire too will have to arise from contact between sense organ and object, because it arises from a contact between the soul and the mind. If [you object that] there is no contact between the mind and the cognized fire, then here too (i.e., in the case of erroneous cognition) there is no contact between the eye and the perceived water.”

[The above analogy between error and inference is possible because the Naiyāyikas consider the mind (*manas*) to be a sense organ (*indriya*).]

There is a striking similarity between the arguments in *TUS* pp. 12.8–10 and 13.7. and those reported by Jayanta as a justification for the new definitions of *ālambana*. Again, as there is no direct quotation, it is difficult to determine whether Jayanta had the *TUS* in mind, or a different work in which the same objections were raised. If the first possibility is true, then this would be a nice example of how a sceptic, even though he does not have any thesis of his own, can stimulate a dogmatic philosopher to re-examine his position, make his definitions more precise, and inspire him to new solutions. *NM* p. 474.16–21:

yas tu tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ (p. 458) 'anyad ālambanam, anyac ca pratibhāti' iti kaiścid āśritaḥ – tatrāpi na sannihitasyālabhanatvam ucyate, yena bhū-pradeśasyāpi tathātvam āśaṅkyeta. nāpi janakasyālabhanatvam, yac cakṣur-ādāv api prasajyeta. kintu idam ity āṅgulyā nirdiśyamānaṃ karmatayā yaj jñānasya janakaṃ, tad ālambanam ity ucyamāne na kaiścid doṣaḥ.

“Some [Ācāryas] advocate the third theory, (viz.) ‘one thing is the external object, and another thing appears [in the cognition]’. As for this [definition] too, it is not claimed that [whatever] is found in proximity is the external object, because one might suspect that the [corresponding] place is such [an external object]. Nor [is it claimed that whatever] produces the cognition is external object, because this would apply to the eye etc. too, but [it is claimed that] that which is pointed at by the finger [to indicate] ‘this [is the external object]’, [and] which produces the cognition by being its direct object, this is the external object. If it is formulated so, there is no fault whatsoever.”

The basic difficulties of the Ācārya theory, i.e., the explanation of errors which were traditionally assumed to have no external object and the process of sublation, remained problematic, but I shall not dwell on these problems any further here, for the later developments were unknown to Jayarāśi, and this would take us too far from our subject matter.

I would like to turn now to the rival Nyāya school of the Vyākhyāṭṛ.

The basic principle of the Vyākhyāṭṛ school is that a cognition's content is determined exclusively by its object.¹⁸ When this principle is applied to the theory of error, it follows that the object of a mirage of water is nothing

but water. As there is no such water at the present, it must necessarily come from the past. Thus, the external object is not the sun-rays but a previously perceived water. *NM* p. 227.7–8:

*anye tv ālambanam prāhuḥ puro 'vasthita-dharminah/
sādrśya-darśanôdbhūta-smṛty-upasthāpitam payah//*

“Others, however, say that the external object [of a mirage of water] is water presented [to the mind] by recollection which is brought about by seeing a similarity between water and a property-possessor which stands before the eyes.”¹⁹

We saw that the Ācāryas tried to refute the *nirālambanānumāna* by claiming that every cognition, even an erroneous one, has an object in reality. The Vyākhyātṛ position is, in a way, more moderate. They admit that the external object of cognition does not exist at the time of its apprehension. Nevertheless, they secure the reality of the world by relying on the absolute transparency of the cognition and the nature of memory: a recollection of water could not have been possible without there being sometime in the past a real water which left the impression (*saṃskāra*) necessary for the production of recollection. That is why errors whose object never existed, for instance, a flower in the sky, do not occur. Thus; a cognition with no present real object presupposes a past real object. Therefore, the Buddhist cannot infer from the fact that some cognitions have no present corresponding object that no cognition ever has one. True cognitions with real objects have a logical primacy over error. This is clearly implied in Jayanta's explanation of the above *śloka* *NM* p. 227.9–14:

*yatra kila jñāne yad rūpam upaplavate, tat tasya ālambanam
ucyate, na sannihitam; bhū-pradeśasya tad-ārambhakāṇām ca
paramāññūnām tad-ālambanatva-prasaṅgāt. idam ca salilāvabhāsi
vijñānam. atas tad evāsyālambanam. tac ca nēha sannihitam.
na caikāntāsataḥ kha-puṣpādeḥ khyātir avakalpata iti deśāntarādau
vidyamānam eva salilaṃ sadṛśa-darśana-prabuddha-saṃskārōpārūḍham
ihāvalambanībhavati.*

“There (i.e., in the above quoted *śloka*), obviously, whatever form appears in the cognition, that [alone] is called its object, [and] not what is found in proximity, because [otherwise] the place [where the object seems to appear] and its constituent atoms would be the external object. And this (i.e. the

mirage) is a cognition where water appears, therefore, its external object is nothing but that [water], but that [water] is not found here in proximity. Nor is the appearance of an absolutely inexistent [thing], like a flower in the sky possible; thus, water which must (eva) exist at another place [and another time] etc. [and] which is brought to consciousness by remembrance produced by impressions awakened by seeing [something] similar [to water], becomes the object here (i.e. in the case of a mirage).”²⁰

We saw that the Ācāryas based their theory of error on the model of doubt. The Vyākhyātṛs on the other hand, used the model of recollection: the sun-rays simply remind the cognizer of similar object. This is also the case with a normal, a non-erroneous recollection, when one thing reminds us of another. Consequently, errors which were traditionally accepted as having a *present* external object had to reinterpreted as having one in the past. Thus the Vyākhyātṛs found themselves in a position diametrically opposed to but as equally awkward as that of the Ācāryas. Both theories lacked explanatory power for the broad division of errors into errors with and without external objects, or substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), and both theories made the same false step in trying to reduce errors to one type only. Just as the Ācāryas were not very convincing in claiming that particles of light (*sūryāmśu*, cf. *NM* p. 475.2–3) are the external object of the *keṣonḍuka* cognition, the Vyākhyātṛs were no more convincing in denying that the sun-rays are the external object of the mirage of water (the most common designation of which is *marīcy-udaka-jñāna*). Another related, but different problem which the Vyākhyātṛs had trouble with was how to account for the cognition’s content. They could not explain how the recollection of water was produced without its space-time determinants. A recollection of water is usually produced with the awareness that the water was seen at a particular place in the past, whereas in the illusion the water is apprehended as ‘here and now’. No solution to this problem seemed possible without giving up, or at least seriously endangering, the basic principle, according to which the object alone is responsible for the cognition’s content.

The theory needed, therefore, some modifications. It was Prabhākara who further developed the Vyākhyātṛ theory by deducing the extreme logical consequences from the Vyākhyātṛ principle. According to Prabhākara, cognitions cannot bring about changes in the properties of the object, not even in the space-time determinants as was explicitly accepted by the Vyākhyātṛs. What the cognition could do, at most, would be not to

apprehend some of the object's properties, but it could not exchange one property for another (e.g. apprehend past water as present water). According to Prabhākara, therefore, error cannot be something positively new. The fact that the object appears as if it were present is nothing but the non-apprehension of the (past) space-time determinants (cf. *Bṛhatī* p. 52.6: *katham tarhi viparyayah? agraḥaṇād evēti vadāmaḥ.*).

However, it was not enough to say that errors are nothing but recollections. Prabhākara had to account for the fact that the object of error was experienced as present before the eyes. In order to do this he claimed that the experience of the object as present is a mere absence, viz. absence of the part 'I remember' (ibid. p. 55.6: *smarāmīti jñāna-śūnyāni smṛti-jñānāni etāni.*). Because of this failure, one mistakes a recollection for perception (*pratyakṣābhimāna, pratyakṣa-saṃmīta*). To describe this failure Prabhākara coined the term *smṛti-pramoṣa*,²¹ "loss of recollection" (cf. *Bṛhatī* p. 53.8–9: *śuktikāyām rajata-jñānam smarāmīti pramoṣāt smṛti-jñānam uktam.* p. 56.5: *smarāmīti smṛti-pramoṣāt pratyakṣa-saṃmītam tat.*), or, more precisely, the loss of awareness (*vyāmoha*) of the fact that the cognition is a recollection (*Bṛhatī* p. 55.3: *vyāmoha-hetavo mithyā-pratyayāḥ.*).

By equating error with recollection, Prabhākara tried to secure the absolute validity of the Veda. The object of the Vedic sentences – which were reduced by Prabhākara to injunctions – always lies in the future. It is something not yet done, for it remains to be done (*kartavya*). As an error presupposes a past experience, i.e., has a past object, it cannot creep into the Veda, because there is no way for a past object to appear as a future one.

Back to the *TUS*. Jayarāṣi's arguments (pp. 17.8–18.4) are not directed at the difference between error and recollection, but rather at the difference between the first apprehension of an object and its recollection. From this shift of perspective, together with the fact that some of the *prasaṅgas* involve sacrifices and Vedic injunctions, we can safely conclude that he has in mind the more radical form of the Vyākhyātṛ theory as propounded by Prabhākara. The contradiction between Prabhākara's claim that nothing new appears in an erroneous cognition, and that it is, nevertheless, characterized as recollection led Jayarāṣi to examine the nature of recollection. He made the point that if no new determinants are allowed to appear in the erroneous cognition characterized as recollection, or for that matter even in an ordinary recollection, then this would destroy the difference between recollection and perception, because in a recollection there is always a new factor: the object

appears as a *remembered* object. The content of recollection is not a simple awareness of the object, for it takes the form 'I had a cognition of that object' (cf. *NBh*, 3.1.14 pp. 734.4–735.1: *ajñāsiṣam aham amum artham. . . jñātavān aham amum artham, asāv artho mayā jñātaḥ, asminn arthe mama jñānam abhūd iti caturvidham*²² . . .). Thus, each recollection contains three different factors: the cognizer, the cognized object and its cognition (ibid.: *sarvatra khalu jñātā jñānam jñeyam ca grhyate* .). It cannot, therefore, be said that nothing new appears in a recollection. On the other hand, one cannot remember something which was not previously experienced. But the object appears in the recollection qualified by the cognizer and the cognition (*NBh* ibid.: *etasyā [smṛter] jñātṛ-jñāna-viśiṣṭaḥ pūrva-jñāto 'rtho viśayo, nārthamātram*). Now the question arises: are these properties, viz. being qualified by previous cognition and being qualified by the cognizer, remembered or not?

If they are remembered, they should appear in a previous, i.e., the first, cognition of the object; but if they appeared in the first cognition of the object, then the first cognition of the object was already a recollection. On the other hand, if these properties are not remembered, i.e., if they are experienced for the first time, they cannot appear in a recollection, for, by definition, whatever appears in a recollection has to be previously experienced. In other words, is the remembered object of recollection identical with the object of a previous experience or not? If it is (absolutely) identical, then the first experience of the object would be a recollection, because the object which appears in it would be a remembered object. If, on the other hand, it is not identical, then experience and recollection would not have the same object, and, therefore, the object which appears in the recollection appears in it for the first time, that is to say it is not remembered.

Thus if one claims, as Prabhākara does, that nothing positively new can appear in an erroneous cognition characterized as a recollection, then either what is usually called recollection would not be recollection, or the first cognition of an object would also have to be accepted as recollection, because there would be no way to account for any difference between them (*TUS* p. 17.8–18.14):

anye tu marīcy-udaka-vijñānasya smṛtitvaṃ pratipadyante, na bhrānti-rūpatām. tasya kathaṃ smṛtitvaṃ? kim udaka-grhītitvena, grhītōdaka-grhītitvena vā, udaka-grahāṇānantara-kāla-bhāvitvena

vā, nirviṣayatvena vā, 'yam aham adrākṣam' ity anenākāreṇōpajāyamānatvena vā?

tad yady udaka-grhītivena, tadā sarvōdaka-vijñānānām smṛtitva-prasaṅgaḥ. atha grhītōdaka-grhītivena smṛtitvam, tadādyasyāpi grhītōdaka-grhītivena smṛtitvam prasajyate, grhītōdaka-grāhitvāviśeṣāt. ādyasya grhītōdaka-grāhitvam nāsti, tadānīm bhinna-viṣayatvam, bhinna-viṣayatve ca dvitīyasyāpi grhīta-grāhitvam vihiyate. atha eka-viṣayatvam āyātam tarhi prathamasyāpi grhīta-grāhitvam, aviśiṣṭārtha-grhīti-rūpatvāt, prathamōttara-vijñānavat. yathaika-nīla-svalakṣaṇa-grāhaka-yugapad-utpannāneka-vijñānāt²³ nīla-jñāna-rūpatā na bhidyate tathēhāpi. tathā dhārāvāhi-vijñānānām smṛti-rūpatā prāpnoti. tathā pratyabhijñānasya ca grhīta-grāhitvena smṛtitvam prasajyate. atha pratyabhijñānasya grhīta-grāhitvam na vidyate, tadā pratyabhijñānatvam nivartate. na hy ādyam darśanam 'sa evāyam' ity upajāyate. tathā ānumānikam api vijñānam grhīta-grāhitvena smṛtitvam āpadyate.

atha udaka-grahaṇōttara-kāla-bhāvitvena smṛtitvam, tadā samskārasya smarāṇa-rūpatā prāpnoti, udaka-grahaṇōttara-kāla-bhāvitvena, rasa-samvedanasya ca.

atha nirviṣayatvena smṛti-rūpatā ucyate, tad ayuktam, pūrvōditā-nubhavāveditārthākārāvedakatvena udīyamānāyāḥ katham nirviṣayatvam? atha pūrvānubhūtārtha-pratyastamaye satī samāna-kālābhāvān nirviṣayatā, tadā codanā-janita-vijñānasya nirviṣayatvena smṛtitvam āpanīpadyate, kartavyatā-rūpārthasya tadābhāvāt. bhāve vā kartavya-rūpatā nōpapadyate. tad-anupapattau sapta-tantu-kriyāyā vilopa-prasaṅgaḥ. yadi ca nirviṣayatvena smṛtitvam, tadā vidyamāna-ghaṭa-jāty-ādeḥ smarāṇasyāsmṛtitva-prasaṅgaḥ. atha 'adrākṣam' ity anenākāreṇōpajāyamānatvena smṛtitvam, tad ayuktam, 'ihōdakam' ity anenākāreṇōpajāyamānāyāḥ katham 'adrākṣam' ity evam-rūpatōpapadyate?

“But others consider the mirage of water as recollection, not as having the nature of false cognition. How is it a recollection? Is it by being an apprehension of water, or by being an apprehension of apprehended water, or by arising after the apprehension of water, or by being without an object, or by being produced with the form ‘[this is the object]’²⁴ which I saw?”

Among these [possibilities], if it is by being an apprehension of water, then all cognitions of water would be recollections. If its being a recollection [of water] is due to its being an apprehension of apprehended water, then the first [apprehension of water] too would be recollection by being an apprehension of apprehended water, because there is no difference in the fact [that both cognitions are] apprehensions of apprehended water.

– The first [cognition] does not apprehend an apprehended water.

– Then it has a different object, and having a different object, the second [cognition] too does not apprehend an apprehended [water]. If [the two cognitions have] the same object, then the fact of apprehending an apprehended water holds good for the first [cognition] too, because it has the form of apprehension of the same object, just like the cognition which is posterior to the first. Just as several cognitions which apprehend the same particular blue [object], and which arise at the same time, do not differ in having the form of a cognition of blue, so here too [the forms of the first and the second cognition of water do not differ]. In the same manner, continuous cognitions would have the nature of recollection. In the same manner, recognition too would be recollection, because it apprehends an apprehended [object]. If a recognition does not apprehend an apprehended [object], then it is no longer a recognition, for a first cognition is not produced [with the form] ‘this is exactly that’. In the same manner, inferential cognition too would be recollection, because it apprehends an apprehended [object].

If [its] being a recollection is due to its arising after the apprehension of water, then a mental impression would have the form of recollection, because it arises after the apprehension of water, and the cognition of taste [of water] too [when it is drunk after being seen]. If it is maintained that [it] has the form of recollection, because it has no object, this is not correct. How [is it possible] that that which is produced as making known the form of an object which was made known by previous experience, is without an object?

If it is without an object because the object does not exist at the same time [as the recollection] assuming that when a previously perceived object was destroyed [in the meantime], then a cognition produced by a Vedic injunction will necessarily be a recollection, because it is without a [contemporaneous] object, since an object [of cognition] which consists in the fact that something has to be done does not exist at that time (i.e. at the

time of the cognition of the injunction). Or if it exists, the fact that it has the form of something to be done is not possible. When this is not possible, the sacrificial actions would disappear. And if being a recollection is due to being without an object, remembering a [still] existing pot, an universal etc. would not be a recollection.

If its being a recollection is due to its being procured in the form 'I saw', this is not correct. How is it possible that that which is produced in the form 'there is water here' has the form 'I saw'?"

In all *vikalpas* but the last, Jayarāṣi argues against possible definitions of recollection. Although he never loses sight of the fact that what is at stake here is not recollection, but false cognition, his arguments apply to any kind of recollection, and not only to defective recollections characterized as *smṛti-pramoṣa*. In the last *vikalpa*, however, the perspective suddenly changes. Jayarāṣi seems to find nothing wrong with the definition of recollection as such, but argues that it cannot apply to the false cognition of water. In a way, this last *vikalpa* can be considered as an introduction to the examination of *smṛti-pramoṣa* which follows immediately upon it. The opponent introduces the *smṛti-pramoṣa* in order to explain why the part 'I remember' does not appear in the cognition of water, and Jayarāṣi proceeds to refute it by claiming that no matter how *smṛti-pramoṣa* is to be understood, it cannot account for the cognition of water. *TUS* p. 18.14–19.6:

atha vipramuṣi[ta]tā²⁵ anayā bhaṅgyā upajāyate, ko 'yaṃ vipramoṣo nāma? kim anubhavākāra-svīkaraṇam, smaraṇākāra-pradhvaṃso vā, apūrvārtha-grhītitvaṃ vā, indriyārtha-sannikarṣa-jatvaṃ vā, indriyārthāsannikarṣa-jatvaṃ vā?
tad yady anubhavākāra-svīkaraṇam, tadā smṛti-rūpatā nōpapadyate. atha smṛti-rūpatā, tadānubhavākāra-svīkaraṇam nōpapadyate, smṛty-anubhavākārayor itaretara-parihāra-sthiti-lakṣaṇatvāt.
atha smaraṇākāra-pradhvaṃsaḥ, tad ayuktam, vijñānasya svayaṃ smṛtitenābhīyupagamāt. pradhvaṃso hy avijñānātmakaḥ katham smṛti-rūpatāṃ vidhatte? athāpūrvārtha-viśaya-grhītitvaṃ smṛti-pramoṣa ucyate, tadātyantānanubhūta-kanaka-panasādi-saṃvittīnāṃ smṛti-vipramoṣatvaṃ āpadyate. atha indriyārtha-sannikarṣa-jatvaṃ smṛti-vipramoṣa ucyate, tadā saṃvittīnāṃ smṛti-vipramoṣatva-prasaṅgaḥ. atha indriyārthāsannikarṣa-jatvaṃ smṛti-vipramoṣa ucyate, tadā codanā-janita-vijñānasyānumānōpamāna-

*vijñānasya ca smṛti-vipramoṣatvam āpadyate. tasmād yathā
yathā vicāryate smṛti-vipramoṣaḥ tathā tathā nyāyaṃ na viśahata
iti. tasmād marīcy-udaka-vijñānasya na smṛti-vipramoṣa-rūpatā,
api tu viparīta-khyātitvaṃ samyag-jñānatvaṃ vā.*

“If [the recollection of water] arises in that manner (i.e., as a direct cognition of water) by being deprived [of the part ‘I saw’], what is this [thing] called deprivation? Is it the adaptation of the form of experience, or the destruction of the form of recollection, or the apprehension of an unprecedented object (*apūrvārtha*), or the production by contact between sense organ and object, or the production without a contact between sense organ and object?

Among these [possibilities], if it is the adaptation of the form of experience, then the fact of having the form of recollection is impossible. If [the cognition] has the form of recollection, then the adaptation of the form of experience is impossible, because the form of recollection and of experience are characterized by mutual exclusion.²⁶

If it is the destruction of the form of experience, this is not correct, because the cognition is accepted by yourself as recollection. Since destruction does not have the character of cognition, how does it affirm the fact of having the form of recollection? If being an apprehension of an unprecedented object is called deprivation of recollection, then cognitions of absolutely inexperienced [objects like] a golden jack fruit etc. would be [cases of] deprivation of recollection. If production by contact between sense organ and object is called deprivation of recollection, then immediate cognitions (*saṃvitti*) would be [cases of] deprivation of recollection. If the production without a contact between sense organ and object is called deprivation of recollection, then the cognition produced by Vedic injunctions and the cognitions of inference and comparison would be [cases of] deprivation of recollection. That is why in whichever way the deprivation of recollection is examined, it does not stand to reason. Therefore the mirage of water does not consist in deprivation of recollection, but is either ‘the appearance of a different/wrong [object]’ (*viparīta-khyātitva*),²⁷ or a valid cognition.”

So far for Jayarāsi’s arguments against the Ācārya and the Vyākhyāṭṭ schools. Now the question may arise whether he had his own theory of error. This seems to be a contradiction in terms for a sceptic like Jayarāsi, for if one does not recognize any means of valid cognition, one cannot establish any theory at all. The *TUS*, however, is full of affirmative sentences. In the

last sentence of the above quoted passage, Jayarāṣi says that a cognition of water is either true, or *vīparīta-khyāti*. Now, the term *vīparīta-khyāti* or its synonym *anyathā-khyāti* is usually used to designate the Ācārya position. If we took the sentence as a simple affirmation, we would have to conclude that the *TUS* is full of contradictions, and that by the time Jayarāṣi criticized Prabhākara he had already forgotten what he had said when criticizing the Ācāryas. In fact, while criticizing the Ācārya theory he affirms the exact opposite (*TUS* p. 12.26–13.5):

atha keṣoṇḍuka-vijñāne kim avabhāti? kim ālambate? keṣoṇḍuka-asyaiva ālambanatvaṃ pratīyamānatvaṃ ca tathā udakasyaiva ālambanatvaṃ pratīyamānatvaṃ ca, nālambanāntaraṃ parikalpyam. na cōdaka-jñānasya pratīyamānōdakānyālambanatvena mithyātvam, api tu abhāvāt tāttvikatvena anyathā keṣoṇḍuka-saṃvido 'pi mithyātvam na prāpnoti, anyālambana-vyatirekāt.

“What appears in the hair-net (*keṣoṇḍuka*) cognition? What is [its] external object? The hair-net itself is the external object, and it is perceived; in the same manner water itself is the external object and it is perceived, no other/different external object should be postulated. The cognition of water is not false because [its] external object is something different from the perceived water, but because [the water] does not exist as a real thing. Otherwise, the hair-net cognition too would not be false because there is no other/different external object [for it].”

How should Jayarāṣi's contradictory statements be understood? Unless we want to affirm that they are simple contradictions and that the man is a fool, something like the following explanation has to be accepted: Jayarāṣi affirms statements incompatible with his opponent's view, and which he thinks the opponent cannot refute without getting himself into trouble (mostly *avyāpti*, *ativyāpti* and internal contradictions). While dealing with different theories, Jayarāṣi makes different statements in the different corresponding contexts. Consequently, when two theories are contradictory, Jayarāṣi will make contradictory statements; he will say black when one opponent says white, and white when another opponent says black. Thus he refutes the Nyāya theory of universals (p. 4.5 f.) as well as the Buddhist refutation of the Nyāya theory of universals (p. 49.19 f.). Here we have very much the same case. We saw that the Ācāryas claim that in the case of error the external object of the cognition is different from its internal

object, while for the Vyākhyātṛs, on the other hand, whatever appears in the cognition is its external object. Therefore, after refuting the Ācārya theory, Jayarāṣi concludes that the cognition's external and internal object are not different, and after refuting the Vyākhyātṛ theory, that they are. Thus all affirmations of Jayarāṣi's, whether they are expressed in a positive or in a negative form, should be understood as negations of their opposite, which do not affirm anything at all.

If this interpretation of Jayarāṣi is accepted, it follows that two seemingly contradictory propositions are not actually contradictory, because of their different intentions. I think most readers will accept this statement intuitively, but probably without being aware of its implications, for it goes against almost every current theory of propositional logic. If, as is usually accepted, truth and falsehood belong to propositions as such, whether they are defined as properties of propositions, or as a relation between a proposition and a 'state of affairs', or as coherence among propositions, or as utility (or inutility) of a proposition etc., it is obvious that my interpretation of Jayarāṣi cannot be accepted, and one is bound to conclude that he simply and stupidly contradicts himself. If, on the other hand, one follows Collingwood,²⁸ and more recently Manor,²⁹ in considering that the meaning of a proposition depends on the question it tries to answer, it follows that truth and falsehood do not belong to the proposition as such, but are relative to that question. It also follows that two propositions cannot be contradictory, unless they are meant as answers to the same question.

The interpretation of Jayarāṣi's statements as conveying no positive affirmations does not differentiate him from other sceptic philosophers such as Sextus Empiricus, or even from a religious philosopher like Nāgārjuna when he says he has no *pakṣa* or *pratijñā*. There are, of course, important differences in form,³⁰ for sceptics are terminological parasites; just as Sextus criticizes the Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic philosophers of his time by using their own terms, Jayarāṣi does the same by using Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Buddhist terms. But the phenomenon of scepticism is certainly common to the three philosophical traditions of India, China and Europe.

Nevertheless, there is I think, something unique in Jayarāṣi. The basic device of Western scepticism is to draw a sharp distinction between true and false cognitions and then make such extreme requirements for true cognitions, that no cognition will ever be able to meet. This device, which is seen at its best in discussions of the criterion of truth, presupposes, of course, that

there is a distinction between true and false cognitions. As far as I know, none of the Western sceptics questioned this presupposition.³¹ They all seem to accept that there is a difference between true and false cognitions; the only trouble is we cannot tell which is which. Jayarāṣi, however, seems to go a step further and deny that there is any difference at all between true and false cognitions; or, to be sure, if there is some difference between them, it does not surpass the difference between two valid cognitions, such as of sweet water and of salted water. *TUS*, p. 14.14–23:

*na ca bhāvākāre pratīyamāne 'bhāva-kalpanā nyāyyā atiprasaṅgāt, anyathā rūpādaḥ pratīyamāne rasādi-kalpanā kartavyā. na ca kriyate. tathēhāpy udakaṃ pratīyate. nanu pratīyate kintv atathyam; yady evam, udaka-prapañca 'yaṃ, dīrghōdakaṃ madhurōdakaṃ iti yathā. nanv atra sarvāśv avasthāśv udakaṃ pratīyate, tena tāsṃ ambhaḥ prakalpyate. yady evaṃ tad ihāpy avasthā-dvaye 'py udakaṃ pratīyate satyōdakaṃ asatyōdakaṃ ca. satyōdaka-jñāne satyōdakaṃ avabhāti nāsatyōdakaṃ anudakaṃ vā. tathā asatyōdaka-jñāne 'satyōdakaṃ pratibhāti na satyōdakaṃ anudakaṃ vā, sva-viśaya-paryavasāyinyo hi buddhayaḥ.*³²

“And it is not correct to assume the inexistence [of water] when the form of the existence [of water] is perceived, because it is absurd,³³ otherwise the assumption of taste etc. would have to be made when colour is perceived. But it is not made. In the same manner, here, too, water is perceived.

- [True, water] is perceived, but it is unreal.
- If so, it is a kind of water (*udaka-prapañca*), just like [in the case of cognitions such as] ‘long [stretch of] water’, ‘sweet water’ [etc].
- There, in all [these] cases, water is perceived, that is why [the existence of] water is assumed there.
- If this is so, then here too, in both cases, water is perceived: real water, and unreal water. In a cognition of real water, real water appears, not unreal water or something different from water (lit. non-water). In the same manner, in a cognition of unreal water, unreal water appears, not real water or something different from water, for cognitions terminate in their own objects.”

How is Jayarāṣi’s queer statement to be understood? Does he give the same ontological status to real and unreal water? The expression *udaka-prapañca* is too elliptical to provide a definite answer to this question, but at the end of the next section (i.e. after the discussion of *bādhā*, translated above)

there comes a passage which leaves no doubt about it. The opponent throws the burden of proof on Jayarāṣi: Suppose you convinced me that a false cognition cannot be sublated, but how come its object does not produce an efficient action (*artha-kriyā*)³⁴? Jayarāṣi's answer is that whatever the efficient action produced by the object of a valid cognition may be, it can also be produced by the object of a false cognition; and the arguments, especially the first one, leave no doubt that it is the external object he is talking about. *TUS* p. 16.10–24:

*yadi na bādhyate kim ity asāv artha-kriyām na karoti bhāvaḥ?
kēyam artha-kriyā yā tena na sampadyate pumsām? kim vijñāna-
rūpā, pravṛtti-rūpā, prāpti-rūpā, sukha-duḥkhōtpāda-bhoga-rūpā vā?
tad yadi vijñāna-lakṣaṇām na karoti, tad ayuktam, vijñāna-lakṣaṇām
artha-kriyām karoty eva toyam. atha pravṛtti-rūpām na karoti,
tad ayuktam, pravṛttiḥ hi puruṣēcchānuvidhāyini nārtha-svarūpa-
bhāvābhāvān anugamayati. puruṣo hi kāmataḥ pravartate vā
na vā, na hy etāvatā tad-abhāva-siddhiḥ. atha prāpti-rūpām artha-
kriyām na karoti tenāsattvam, tad apy ayuktam, candrārka-
graha-nakṣatra-tārakādeḥ prāpti-abhāve 'pi sattva-sambhavāt.
atha sukha-duḥkha-rūpām artha-kriyām na karoti, kim darśana-
jam sukham na karoty āho deha-sambandha-jam? tad yadi
darśana-jam na karoti, tad ayuktam, karoty eva. atha deha-
sambandha-jam na karoti, tadā candrārka-graha-nakṣatrādau
vyabhicārah; teṣām deha-sambandha-ja-sukha-janakatvaṃ nāsti,
atha ca sattvam. na cārtha-kriyākartṛtvena vastūnām asattvaṃ
sva-hetor eva vijñāna-jananamātrasyōtpatteḥ sahakāri-virahād
vā na karoti.*

“If [false cognition] is not sublated, why does not this thing (*bhāva*, i.e. the object of false cognition) produce an efficient action (*artha-kriyā*)?”

– What is this efficient action which is not accomplished for the people by that [object]? Does it have the form of cognition, the form of activity, [towards the object], the form of obtainment [of the object], or the form of experience which consists in the arising of pleasure and pain?

Among these [possibilities], if it does not produce [an efficient action] which is characterised as cognition, this is not correct, [for even illusory] water does produce an efficient action characterised as cognition. If it does not produce [an efficient action] which has the form of activity, this is

not correct, for activity follows (i.e., is due to) the volition of men; it does not follow the existence or inexistence of the object itself, for a man acts or does not [act] according to his desire: the inexistence of that [object] is not established by that much.

– [The object of false cognition] does not produce an efficient action which has the form of obtainment, that is why [it is said to be] inexistent.

– This is also not correct, because existence is possible even if there is no obtainment, [as in the case of] of sun, moon, planets, constellations, stars etc.

If it does not produce an efficient action which has the form of pleasure or pain, does it not produce a pleasure which arises from seeing [the object], or [a pleasure] which arises from a relation to (i.e., contact with) the body?

If it does not produce [a pleasure] which arises from seeing [the object], this is not correct, it does.

If it does not produce [a pleasure] which arises from a relation to the body, then this does not hold good for the sun, moon, planets, constellations etc.; they do not produce a pleasure which arises from a relation to the body, but nevertheless they exist.

And it is not by their not being agents of efficient action that things do not exist, because [a thing may be] produced by its own cause³⁵ [in such a way] that it produces nothing but [its own] cognition; or due to the absence of a coproducer [the thing] does not produce [anything at all].”

Strange arguments indeed. But according to my interpretation, this passage is not to be understood as affirming that ‘a false cognition of water is produced by unreal water’, but rather as answering in the negative the question ‘how can you prove that false cognition of water is not produced by some kind of water?’. And the answer goes: not by the mere fact that the cognition is produced (the possibility that a cognition of water is produced by sun-rays has already been refuted, and Jayarāsi does not have to repeat these arguments here); not by the absence or presence of activity on the part of the cognizer, for activity is not due to the existence of the object; not by the obtainment of the object, because certain objects cannot be obtained; and certainly not by the subjective experience of pleasure or pain. One can hardly see what other possibilities are left for the opponent in order to substantiate his claim that the object of a false cognition does not exist.

Interpreted in this manner, the arguments start to make sense, but,

nevertheless, one has a quizzical feeling about them: Is Jayarāṣi pulling our leg? One can detect a certain irony in his arguments and, personally, I am never sure how serious he is. It is often the case with Jayarāṣi that he formulates arguments in which he does not believe, but which, he thinks (and usually with good reasons), his opponent cannot refute.

Reading through the *TUS*, the impression one gets of Jayarāṣi is of an excellent logician, confident of himself, intellectually independent and self-reliant, someone for whom philosophical reasoning is a playful activity. One can distinctly feel how he rejoices in the destructive force of his arguments; and one can almost see him smiling at his opponents, as if he was saying 'Refute me, if you can'. He is certainly the most anarchical philosopher of ancient India to have come down to us.

ABBREVIATIONS

- TUS*: *Tattvopaplavasimha* of Jayarāṣi Bhaṭṭa, ed. S. Sanghavi and R. Parikh. Gaekwad's Oriental Series 87, Baroda 1940.
- NBh*: *Nyāyabhāṣya* cf. *NS*.
- NBhū*: *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* of Bhasarvajña, ed. S. Yogīndrananda. Vārāṇasi 1968.
- NM*: *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, ed. K. S. Varadacharya. Oriental Research Institute Series 106, Mysore 1969.
- Prameyaprakaraṇa*, ed. D. Śāstri. Kashi Sanskrit Series 106 Benares 1934.
- NMGBh*. *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* of Cakradhara, ed. N. S. Shah. L. D. Series 35, Ahmedabad 1972.
- NV*: *Nyāyavārttika* cf. *NS*.
- NVTT*: *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* cf. *NS*.
- NS*: *Nyāyasūtra* of Gotama with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's *Vārttika*, Vācaspati Miśra's *Tātparyāṭikā* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatīrtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatīrtha. Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, Calcutta 1936.
- Pañcapādikā*: *Pañcapādikā* of Padmapādācārya with two comm. and *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* with two comm. ed. S. Śrīrāma Śāstrī and S. R. Krishnamurthi Śāstrī. Madras Government Oriental Series CLV, Madras 1958.
- Brhatī*: *Brhatī* of Prabhākara Miśra with the *Rjuvimalā* of Śālikanātha, ed. A. Chinnaśwāmī Śāstrī. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 391, Benares 1929.
- YS*: *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali, ed. R. S. Bodas. Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series XLVI, Bombay 1917.
- ŚV*: *Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila in *Ślokavārttikavyākhyātātparyāṭikā* of Umveka Bhaṭṭa, ed. S. K. Ramanatha Sastri. Madras University Sanskrit Series 13, Madras 1971.

NOTES

* I am indebted to Professors A. Wezler, S. A. Śrinivasan, L. Schmithausen, and Ms. K. Preisendanz from the Indological Institute of the University of Hamburg, as well as to Professor K. Bhattacharya from the CNRS Paris for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. Some of the better points presented here were developed as a direct result of our discussions.

¹ Cf. *JIPh*, 11 (1983) pp. 147–166.

² In presenting Jayarāśi's opponents, I shall rely heavily on Schmithausen's admirable study in *Maṇḍanamīśra's Vibhramaviveka, mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der Indischen Irrtumslehre*. Wien 1965. This study is one of the finest 'flowers' of the Frauwallner school, but for some reason it seems to be relatively unknown; perhaps because it is 'hidden' as an appendix to the edition and translation of the *Vibhramaviveka*. It goes without saying that my purpose in this paper is not a systematic discussion of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā theories of error, and I shall restrict myself only to those points which are criticized by Jayarāśi.

³ According to Schmithausen (*op. cit.* p. 163), ever since Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, but in fact already in the *Nyāyasūtra*; cf. *NS*, 4.2.4 ff., cf. also W. Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's*, Leipzig 1928, p. 216 n. 278. Schmithausen's conception of the historical development of the theory of error is probably influenced by Frauwallner's statement that Dignāga's work is the turning point, after which epistemological problems became the central preoccupation of Indian philosophers. I do not doubt the general validity of this statement, but it seems to me that, in the particular case of the theory of error, the data cannot be ordered in such a clear-cut scheme.

⁴ Schmithausen suggests (*op. cit.* p. 164) that this is perhaps due to Kumārila's "andersgeartete Ontologie". If by that he means the rejection of *samavāya*, I do not see how it affects the theory of error in any way. Schmithausen's presentation of Kumārila is a bit fragmentary, probably because he missed the important discussion in *ŚV*, *Śūnyavāda* in which Kumārila explains (under Śamkhya influence? Cf. A. Wezler, *Studien zum Dvadaśāranayacakra des Śvetāmbara Mallavādin: I. Der Sarvasarvātmatvavāda*. in *Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus*, ed. K. Bruhn and A. Wezler. Wiesbaden 1981) errors in relative terms (212 f.) immediately after the exposé of a basically Vyākhyātṛ theory (200 f.).

⁵ Cf. *NMGBh* p. 44.12–13: *iha ca sarvatracārya-śabdena Uddyotakara-vivṛti-kṛto Rucikāra-prabhṛtayo vivakṣitāḥ, Vyākhyātṛ-śabdena ca Bhāṣya-vivaraṇa-kṛtaḥ Pravara-prabhṛtayo iti*.

⁶ Cf. E. Steinkellner, *Die Literatur des älteren Nyāya, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, Vol. 5, 1961 p. 160.

⁷ Cf. A. Wezler, *Zur Identität der "Ācāryaḥ" und "Vyākhyātaraḥ" in Jayantabhattacha's Nyāyamañjarī*. *WZKS* Vol. 19, 1975 p. 141.

⁸ Cf. *NM* p. 218.11: *tad etad ācāryaḥ pratisamādhate – na viśaya-bhedād eva pratibhāsa-bhedah, kin tu upāya-bhedād bhavaty eva*. Cf. also B. Gupta, *Die Wahrnehmung in der Nyāyamañjarī*. Walldorf-Hessen 1963 p. 97 n. 222.

Schmithausen (*op. cit.* p. 163) uses the terms limited transparency of cognition and absolute transparency of cognition to designate the basic principles of the Ācārya and the Vyākhyātṛ respectively. There is no harm in that, of course, as long as one remembers the exact definitions he gives to these terms. Note, however, that the cognition is absolutely transparent for both the Ācārya and the Vyākhyātṛ.

⁹ Vācaspati (*NVTT ad loc.* p. 114.14) glosses *eka* with *eka-deśa-mata*.

¹⁰ Cf. *Pañcapādikā* p. 49.7–50.1: *kiñca – rajata-rūpeṇa cet pariṇatā śukti kṣīram iva dadhi-rūpeṇa, tadā doṣāpagame 'pi tathaivāvatīṣṭhate. nanu kamala-mukula-vikāsa-pariṇāma-hetoḥ sāvitrasya tejasah sthiti-hetutvam api dṛṣṭam tad-apagame punaḥ mukulibhāva-darśanāt*. Cf. also P. Hacker, *Vivarta*. Wiesbaden 1953, pp. 36–37.

¹¹ Cf. J. May, *Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*. Paris 1959, p. 79 n. 135.

¹² One often comes across *ca*, especially in negated sentences, where *hi*, or something similar, would be expected. Indeed, both Buddhist and Hindu commentators tell us that *ca* is sometimes used to convey reason or explanation (*co hetvarthaḥ, co yasmāt*). However, none of the dictionaries available to me (PW, MW, Apte, Renou) glosses *ca* with any word which could even remotely suggest that *ca* may convey reason. Is it therefore a mere commentator's trick, or an insufficiency of the dictionaries? I think the dictionaries are at fault on this point, but I do not care for arguing that *ca* has an additional meaning of 'for' over and above its other more common meanings (it depends very much on what one understands by meaning). That much, however, is clear: *ca* is sometimes used to connect two sentences, the second of which provides the reason for the first. Therefore, there is no reason why it should not be translated with 'for' in such cases.

¹³ This theory is generally ascribed to Prabhākara, but it is not to be found in the *Brhatī*. Schmithausen (*op. cit.* pp. 239–240) suggests that it either appeared in one of Prabhākara's lost works, or that it was developed by one of his followers.

¹⁴ Jayaraśi refers to the *NS*, 3.2.24: *anīyatva-graṇāṇāḍ buddher buddhy-antarād vināśaḥ śabdavat*. "Cognition is destroyed by another cognition, since one apprehends that it is not eternal, just like sound."

Vātsyāyana is not aware of the problems involved in the formulation of the *sūtra*, but Uddyotakara has some trouble to explain how a cognition which has not yet been produced can destroy a cognition which is subsequent to it. In order to save the *sūtra* he has to give up the absolute momentariness of cognitions. Cf. *NV ad loc.* p. 859.9–10: *atha manyase na dve buddhi saha bhavanto yataḥ parayā pūrva nivartyate. tac ca na, yugapad-utpatti-niṣedhāt* [cf. *NS*, 1.1.16] – *yugapad-utpattiḥ niṣedhyati na sahabhāvāḥ*.

¹⁵ Jayanta probably refers to the *TUS* p. 14.3–4:

yadi ca abhāva-jñānena abhāva-vyavasthā kriyate, bhāva-jñānena ca bhāva-vyavasthā, tadā udakasya bhāvābhāvau eka-kālau syātām.

"And if the inexistence [of water] is established by the cognition of the inexistence [of water], and the existence [of water] is established by the cognition of the existence [of water], then the water would exist and not exist at the same time."

¹⁶ At this point Jayanta refers the reader to the *Kṣanabhaṅgabhaṅga* where, he says, it will be shown that the object of perception is not limited to the present. I suppose he means the section on *pratyabhijñā* (*NM*, *Prameyaprakaraṇa* pp. 31.20–33.22). However, as far as I understand the arguments therein, they do not add anything new to what is already stated here, but simply multiply the examples; cf. for instance p. 33.1–3:

nanu atīte 'rthe katham indriyaṃ pravartate? kasyaiśa paryanuyogah? nēndriyasyācetanatvāt, puruṣas tv avisphāritākṣo nēdṛṣīm pratipattiṃ labhate visphāritākṣas tu labhate iti so 'pi nānuyogah.

" – How can a sense organ act upon a past object? – Who is to be blamed? Not the sense organ, because it is not conscious. The man, however, whose eyes are closed, does not have such an apprehension (i.e. recognition), but [a man] whose eyes are open does. Thus he is not to be blamed either."

Reading these arguments of Jayanta, I cannot help thinking that Collingwood was right in his analysis of realism; cf. *Essay on Metaphysics*. Chicago 1972 ed. pp. 34–5.

¹⁷ Cf. Schmithausen *op. cit.* p. 249.

¹⁸ Cf. *NM* p. 216.4, 7: *atra punaḥ pravarāḥ prāhuḥ – . . . na hi viṣayātīśayam antareṇa pratibhāsātīśayo bhavitum arhati*. Cf. also Gupta *op. cit.* p. 101 n. 229.

¹⁹ After some hesitation I decided to follow Schmithausen (*op. cit.* p. 175), who attributes this *śloka* to the Vyākhyātī. Note, however, that for Jayanta this is the second of the three Ācārya theories. Perhaps the word *ācārya* is used here in a more general meaning which can include any Naiyāyika. This seems to go against the testimony of Cakradhara who says that everywhere (*sarvatra*) in the *NM* the word *ācāryāḥ* refers to the school of the Rucikāra (cf. n. 5 above). Perhaps the word *sarvatra* is to be understood as throughout the book and not in every single case, though this does not seem very likely.

²⁰ Cf. also *Bṛhatī* pp. 54.6–7: *svapnādiṣu bahir-avabhāsā samvit, sā ca bāhyārtham antareṇa na sambhāvati*.

²¹ The formation of the term probably owes to the definition of recollection in the *YS*, 1.11: *anubhūta-viśayāsampramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ*.

²² Vācaspati (*NVTT* pp. 734.16–735.14) explains the difference between the four types of recollection as a difference in emphasis; in one case the agent is predominant (*kartr-pradhāna*), in another the object (*karma-pradhāna*) etc. He seems though to have had a slightly different *Bhāṣya* text before him than the one quoted above.

²³ Read *viññānāṇaṃ* instead of *viññānāt*.

²⁴ One could expect *yad aham adrākṣam*, since all the previous *vikalpas* contain the neuter *udaka*. However, *yam aham adrākṣam* is a stock phrase in which the *yam* refers to the masculine *artha*. The origin of the expression is probably to be traced to the *NBh*, 3.1.14

²⁵ Read *vipramuṣitatayā* instead of *vipramuṣitatā*.

²⁶ Cf., however, *Nyāyabindu* 3.75 (ed. D. Malvania, Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1955, p. 203): *paraspara-parihāra-sthita-lakṣaṇatayā va bhāvābhāvavat*.

²⁷ The word *viparīta* is not to be understood as 'opposite', but rather in the weaker sense of 'different'. Indeed, it would be strange to say that water is the opposite of sun-rays, or that a man is the opposite of a trunk. Cf. for instance, *NBhū* p. 32.2–3: *anyathā-pratibhāsanād viparīta-khyātir evēti*.

²⁸ Cf. Collingwood, *op. cit.* pp. 21–33; *An Autobiography*. Oxford University Press (reprint) 1978, Chapter 5.

Collingwood is, of course, not the first one to interpret meaning in terms of question and answer. As he points out, this goes back at least as far as Plato, who defined meaning as a dialogue of the Soul with itself, and, as we know from his writings, by dialogue he meant questions and answers. In India, the same view is clearly seen in the commentators' literature. For instance, the most common procedure in the commentaries is to formulate a question (often in the form of doubt) to which the *mūla*-text is introduced as an answer.

²⁹ Cf. R. Manor, *Dialogues and the logic of questions and answers*. *Linguistische Berichte* (Vieweg), Heft 73, Juni 1981, pp. 1–28.

³⁰ To give one example: Western scepticism is intimately related with doubt (the Oxford dictionary, for instance, glosses *scepsis* with 'philosophical doubt'). For Sextus, all cognitions are doubtful cognitions, and that is why one has to suspend judgement. For Jayarāsi, on the other hand, there is no such thing as doubtful cognition, cf. *TUS* pp. 19.7–20.14.

³¹ This also holds for Taoist sceptics like Chuang Tzu and Lieh Tzu. However, I am not in a position to attempt any generalisation on Chinese philosophy.

³² Cf. *NBhū* p. 33.8–10: *etena yad āhur eke – satyōdakam asatyōdakam cēty udaka-pranpañco 'yam madhurōdakādivat. tatra yathā satyōdaka-buddhau nāsatyōdakam pratibhāti, anudakam vā, evam asatyōdaka-jñāne 'pi na satyōdakam pratibhāty anudakam vēti. svaviśaye paryavasāyīnyo buddhayaḥ. tasmān na viparīto 'stīti.*

³³ A friend criticized my translation of *atiprasaṅga* as 'absurd'. Granted that it is not a literal translation, I shall try to justify it shortly. There are some important differences between *prasaṅga* and *atiprasaṅga*: *prasaṅga* is used to indicate an undesired consequence (either because it is absurd, or because it is incompatible with the opponent's premises), and it always involves two propositions. (It takes such forms as "if 'p' is accepted, the undesired consequence 'q' is inevitable" or "not 'r' because (otherwise) 'q' would be inevitable", etc.) *Atiprasaṅga*, on the other hand, involves only one proposition: not 'p', because *atiprasaṅga*. Thus, no undesired consequence needs to be specified, and this is so because 'p' itself is already unacceptable. Furthermore, after checking all occurrences of the word *atiprasaṅga* in the TUS, I came to the conclusion that the propositions connected with it are introduced by Jayarāsi in order to fill up purely logical holes in the argumentation, but which no opponent in his right mind would actually maintain.

³⁴ The concept of *artha-kriyā* has strong Buddhist connotations, but it is not exclusively a Buddhist term, and it is clear from the context, i.e., the refutation of the word *avyabhicārin* of the NS 1.1.4, that the opponent is a Naiyāyika. The main difference between the Buddhist and the Nyāya concepts of *artha-kriyā* is that for the Buddhist an efficient action does not prove the reality of the object; an inferential cognition, for instance, may lead to an efficient action without its object, the universal, being considered real. For the Nyāya, however, the efficient action proves the reality of the object. It seems to me, therefore, that there is no essential difference between the Nyāya concept of *artha-kriyā* and the more common one of *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*. As far as I can see, *artha-kriyā* can be used more vaguely, and can have a larger semantic field than *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*, which is sometimes reduced to the strict *artha-prāpti*, the actual obtaining of the object. Thus the efficient action of an object may simply be the production of cognition, and this enables the Naiyāyikas to consider the cognitions of sun, moon, and other such objects which cannot be obtained to be valid.

It also seems that there is a difference of perspective between *artha-kriyā* and *pravṛtti-sāmarthya*. *Pravṛtti-sāmarthya* refers to an activity of the cognizer, i.e. it is a property of the subject, whereas *artha-kriyā* is mostly a property of the object.

³⁵ Cf. similar formulations in TUS pp. 40.19–20, 47.16–17, 52.12–13 etc.; *svahetor eva* . . . is used when no further justification is given, and has always an undertone of arbitrariness: things are so, because they are produced in that manner by their causes. One could equally say things are so because they are so.

Note also that *arthakriyā* is used here in a narrower, more literal sense than the above, for it cannot include *vijñānarūpā arthakriyā*.