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**Hetuvidyā and the Science of Pramāṇa
The South Asian Scene and East Asian Developments**

Special editors

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**VERLAG DER
ÖSTERREICHISCHEN
AKADEMIE DER
WISSENSCHAFTEN**

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Preface

1. INTRODUCTION

The contributions to this volume were selected from among the seventeen papers that were read at the panel “Pramāṇa across Asia: India, China, Korea, Japan”, held at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna, August 18-23, 2014. This panel was convened by Eli Franco (University of Leipzig) and Jeseon Woo (Dongguk University, Seoul), in the context of the collaborative research project “Laboratory for Globalization of Korean Studies” supported by a generous Academy of Korean Studies Grant and located at Dongguk University. The purpose of the panel was to draw attention to the issue of the transition of Buddhist dialectics, logic and epistemology from South to East Asia and advance our understanding of this process. Compared to the transmission of these branches of Buddhist learning to Tibet, it has been relatively understudied, at least in scholarship in European languages.¹

The Chinese Buddhist canon has preserved some early dialectical–philosophical tracts that no longer exist in the original Sanskrit, such as the *Upāyahṛdaya (Fangbian xin lun 方便心論) and the *Tarkaśāstra (Rushi lun 如實論) which were first made accessible outside the Chinese speaking world by Giuseppe Tucci.² Furthermore, it contains a translation of Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha, of which only some Sanskrit fragments have been preserved,³ and Śāṅkarasvāmin’s Nyāyapraveśa. The tradition of Buddhist dialectics, logic and epistemology in China, known as *yinming* (因明) or “science of the reason” (*hetuvidyā*), was developed largely on the basis of Dignāga’s theories as preserved in the Nyāyamukha and Nyāyapraveśa. Dharmakīrti’s œuvre and that of his followers do not seem to have been translated into Chinese, and thus the logical–episte-

¹ Notable exceptions are the studies by Uwe Frankenhäuser (*Die Einführung der buddhistischen Logik in China*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996) and Christoph Harbsmeier (*Science and Civilization in China*. Vol. 7, Part 1: *Language and Logic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

² Giuseppe Tucci, *Pre-Diñnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*. Translated with an Introduction, Notes and Indices. [Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 49]. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929.

³ For the Nyāyamukha, too, the pioneering achievement of Tucci should be mentioned; see his *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*. The Oldest Buddhist Text on Logic after Chinese and Tibetan Materials. [Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus 15]. Heidelberg: Harrassowitz, 1930.

mological tradition of Buddhist philosophy shaped by the towering figure of Dharmakīrti had practically no impact on the development of the Chinese Hetuvidyā tradition. This resulted in a peculiar historical situation. In an earlier study, one of the present editors drew up the following analogy to illustrate this situation: In a country that cultivates strong cultural and religious ties with ancient Greece from the beginning of the Presocratic period, some intellectuals become interested in Greek philosophy and begin to translate certain Presocratic works as well as some Platonic dialogues into their own language, some of which were subsequently lost in the original Greek. Then, for some unknown reason, the philosophical link between the two countries is severed and the following generations of philosophers of this imaginary country never even hear of Aristotle, Hellenistic philosophy and the philosophical developments that take place in Europe during the subsequent centuries. The last Greek philosopher with whose work the philosophers of this country are familiar is Plato, and an indigenous tradition of logic is developed in the form of commentaries on his early dialogues or in independent treatises based on them. Surely, such a situation opens up fascinating perspectives for scholarly research on the intellectual history of both countries.⁴

It is clear that the Chinese Hetuvidyā tradition should not be studied in isolation from the South Asian tradition of the “science of the reason”, which finds expression *inter alia* in the aforementioned *Upāyahṛdaya and *Tarkaśāstra, and in Yogācāra Abhidharma works, such as the Yogācārabhūmi, specifically its Hetuvidyā section, and the dialectical section of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, as well as in non-Buddhist literature of the classical period, such as the early-classical medical work called Carakasamhitā, more precisely: the small dialectical treatise incorporated in it, and the foundational work of the Nyāya philosophical tradition, the Nyāyasūtra. Moreover, many central issues and topics treated in this literature were further developed and placed in larger perspectives within the South Asian Buddhist tradition of logic and epistemology, starting already with Dignāga’s last work, the Pramāṇasamuccaya or “Summa of [my Thoughts on] the Means of Knowledge”. In the medieval period, this tradition was continued by Dharmakīrti and his many able followers, with a strong emphasis on the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and in permanent sophisticated controversy with their philosophical opponents within and without the Buddhist fold. The present volume therefore contains contributions both on Hetuvidyā and on the science of Pramāṇa as developed by South Asian Buddhist philosophers and non-Buddhist thinkers. It thus aims to provide insight into the larger historical as well as philosophical backdrop to the logic and epistemology of Xuanzang

⁴ Cf. Eli Franco, Xuanzang’s Proof of Idealism (*vijñaptimātratā*). *Hōrin* 11 (2004) 199-212.

who played a decisive role in the spread and development of Hetuvidyā in China, Korea and Japan.

Obviously, the present volume does not form a coherent whole inasmuch as it does not aim at a systematic and comprehensive presentation of its subject matter. However, each and every of its papers is based on foundational new research and advances our knowledge in crucial points. It should thus spark renewed interest in the exploration of the wide-ranging tradition of Chinese Hetuvidyā, before its South Asian backdrop and beyond. If the reader will agree with this judgement, the organizers of the panel and the editors of the volume will consider their labor well spent.

2. SYNOPSIS

As already addressed above, the foundation of the Chinese tradition of Hetuvidyā was laid in Dignāga's writings and the Nyāyapraveśa. In South Asia, the origin of Hetuvidyā goes back to several centuries before Dignāga's time. However, to use, with some modification, the title of Tucci's seminal monograph,⁵ very few pre-Dignāga Buddhist texts on dialectics and early logic, or even non-Buddhist texts on this combined subject, have come down to us. Shōryū Katsura deals with one of these texts which has only been preserved in its Chinese translation, a short work called Fangbian xin lun (方便心論) in Chinese whose title is usually reconstructed as Sanskrit *Upāyahṛdaya, following Tucci's suggestion.⁶ After a brief review of the date, authorship and original Sanskrit title of this much discussed and often referred to early-classical Buddhist treatise on scholarly debate, Katsura characterizes the motivation and aim of its author in the broader intellectual and cultural context. He then provides an overview of the subject matter of its four chapters comparing it with the content of similar treatises on debate preserved in the Carakasamhitā and the Nyāyasūtra and attempting to determine the mutual chronological relationship of these sources. In doing so, he naturally pays special attention to the topics of erroneous objections or false rejoinders (*jāti*s) and situations of defeat (*nigrahassthānas*). Turning to the third chapter of the treatise dedicated to the proper way of conducting a debate, Katsura presents an annotated translation and analysis of the arguments and counter-arguments adduced there by a non-Buddhist opponent and his counterpart, the Buddhist proponent, respectively, which

⁵ See n. 2 above.

⁶ Erich Frauwallner considered *Prayogasāra a more probable original title; see his Vasubandhu's Vādaśāstra. WZKSÖ 1 (1957) 104-146, p. 107 (= *Kleine Schriften*, ed. Gerhard Oberhammer – Ernst Steinkellner. Wiesbaden, 1982, p. 719).

center on several crucial issues such as the existence of living beings, the eternity of the Self, and the existence of Nirvāṇa in its two forms. The translation is the first translation into English of a major part of the Fangbian xin lun which so far has been accessible to those who do not know Chinese only through Tucci's translation into Sanskrit published in 1929.⁷ The comments and analysis provided by Katsura greatly advance the understanding of this partly difficult and enigmatic text. In his conclusion, Katsura stresses that the Buddhist proponent does not avail himself of the early-classical five-membered syllogism to prove his point, but uses *prasaṅga*-type arguments similar to the style of arguments employed by Nāgārjuna and his Mādhyamika followers.

The debate on crucial issues between Buddhist and non-Buddhist thinkers along the lines of Hetuvidyā also figures in Shinya Moriyama's article "On *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana*" which concerns a central aspect of the Hetuvidyā tradition that will also emerge in Mingjun Tang's contribution to this volume. In this article, Moriyama elucidates one of the four types of the pseudo-reason called *viruddha* ("contradictory"), starting from its exposition in Śāṅkarasvāmin's Nyāyapraveśa and the examples provided there in the form of proofs ascribed to philosophical opponents of the Buddhists. To provide the historical backdrop, Moriyama turns to Dignāga's explanation of the contradictory pseudo-reason in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(vṛtti), basing himself on an unpublished Sanskrit reconstruction of the text by Shōryū Katsura and Toshikazu Watanabe. He then treats Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of this passage, in the unpublished edition of the third chapter of the *Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* by Katsura and Watanabe, and with reference to the Sanskrit manuscript. Moriyama demonstrates that in Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation Dignāga only alluded to examples for the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* ("proving the opposite of the own nature of the subject of inference") reason and the closely related *dharmivīśeṣaviparītasādhana* ("proving the opposite of a specific quality of the subject of inference") reason, and that Jinendrabuddhi therefore presents his own example for the *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* reason, in the form of an alleged proof of the eternity of ether, etc., by a Vaiśeṣika, which he then distinguishes from another pseudo-reason called *āśrayāsiddha* ("unestablished in terms of its locus") because the proof operates with a reason that is a mere exclusion, i.e., a mere concept, which can well be applied to ether, etc., as fictitious subjects.

At this point, Moriyama returns to the Vaiśeṣika proof of "existence" as ontologically separate from substance, quality and motion, which is adduced as an example by Śāṅkarasvāmin and explained by his commentator Haribhadrāsūri who demonstrates that one of the combined reasons employed in this proof

⁷ See again n. 2 above.

actually proves the non-existence of “existence” and at the same time fulfils the three conditions for being a valid reason (*trairūpya*), an interpretation that is also found some hundred years earlier in Kuiji’s *Yinming ru zhengli lun shu* (因明入正理論疏) on the *Nyāyapraveśa*, his “Great Commentary on Hetu-vidyā” (*Yinming da shu* 因明大疏). This leads to the problem of the over-application of such a kind of counter-reasoning to any proof of a specific nature of some subject of inference, namely, showing the employed reason to be faulty inasmuch as it would prove any other own nature of the subject that is opposite to its own nature as assumed by the proponent of the proof or even by the respondent, including clearly absurd attributions of own nature. This problem was already noticed by both Haribhadrāsūri and Kuiji. In this context, Moriyama focuses on an important passage in Kuiji’s commentary where Kuiji addresses the issue and emphasizes that when one points out the fault of employing a *dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana* reason, the “opposite” must relate to the topic of the debate, i.e., the opposite proven by the very same reason must be the opposite of the own nature of the subject of inference under discussion as intended by the proponent, and not of any own nature accepted by the proponent or in general. In conclusion, Moriyama addresses Dharmakīrti’s silence on this type of faulty reason and offers two explanations: (1) the reasoning connected with it actually works beyond the frame of Dignāga’s *trairūpya* scheme, and (2) its application makes sense in the context of a debate on entities, such as God and the soul, that are considered fictitious by either of the two adversaries, but does not have a place in Dharmakīrti’s rigorous logic based on the Buddhist metaphysics of “own nature” (*svabhāva*).

Dignāga’s *oeuvre*, which forms the background of the specific dialectical–logical issue treated in Moriyama’s article, is also at the center of Horst Lasic’s contribution, even though in the form of Dignāga’s last work and with a focus on an epistemological–logical topic. As is well known, Dignāga’s last work, his magnum opus on the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* together with Dignāga’s own *Vṛtti*, is available only in the form of a relatively late, poor and in parts even incomprehensible Tibetan translation.⁸ Even though a Sanskrit manuscript of this work has not yet been discovered, the textual situation changed dramatically with the discovery of a manuscript of Jinen-drabuddhi’s commentary on it, the *Viśālāmalaṅkāraṭī* *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, whose Sanskrit text not only facilitates a deeper understanding of Dignāga’s work, but also allows a precise reconstruction of large portions of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(*vṛtti*). So far, the first two chapters of this commentary have

⁸ The Tibetan Buddhist canon contains two translations, by Kanakavarman and Śa ma sen rgyal, and Vasudhararakṣita and Dad pa’i śes rab, respectively, but unfortunately they were not prepared independently of each other, the former being only a revised version of the latter.

been edited, diplomatically and critically, by Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic and Ernst Steinkellner.⁹ In his article on “Dignāga on a Famous Sāṅkhya Definition of Inference” in the present volume, Lasic contributes a study of early Sāṅkhya logic as reflected in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(vṛtti) by taking up the Sāṅkhya definition of inference ascribed to Vārṣaganya, that is, *sambandhād ekasmāt pratyakṣāc cheṣasiddhir anumānam*, which is discussed in this work and was treated as part of Vārṣaganya’s lost *Ṣaṣṭitantra* by Erich Frauwallner in his seminal article on the epistemology of classical Sāṅkhya.¹⁰ After a brief exposition and evaluation of Frauwallner’s and Birgit Kellner’s translations (and interpretations) of the sentence that presents the crucial definition (a further translation, by Edeltraud Harzer, is considered later on in his article), Lasic carefully examines and discusses in a lucid manner, step by step, several text passages at the beginning of Dignāga’s treatment of this definition. Lasic does so on the basis of his meticulous Sanskrit reconstruction of the text (appended to the article) which is based on numerous Sanskrit fragments, the Tibetan translations and the evidence of the precious manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary. In the course of his examination, he also considers the evidence of further treatments and interpretations of the definition as seen in other works, such as the *Nyāyavārtika*, the *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* and the *Yukti-dīpikā*.

The result of Lasic’s deliberations is that in Dignāga’s interpretation the term *pratyakṣa* in the definition, at least in the part of Dignāga’s discussion treated here, has to be understood as referring to perception (and not to its object, the perceptible or perceived thing), and furthermore that this word, and not the word *sambandha*, is qualified by the adjective “one”. Thus, a philologically and historically well founded, coherent and convincing picture of the precise meaning of the definition according to Dignāga’s understanding emerges, which may also have been the interpretation of an anonymous commentator on this definition some of whose comments are preserved in passage 2 of the treated text section. For want of further evidence, Lasic sagaciously leaves open the question whether this interpretation matches the original intention of the author of the definition or whether it already represents a further development within Sāṅkhya epistemology. Without doubt, this study is a major contribution not only to our un-

⁹ Ernst Steinkellner – Helmut Krasser – Horst Lasic (ed.), *Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 1. Part 1: Critical Edition. Part 2: Diplomatic Edition*. Beijing: China Tibetology Publishing House – Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2005; Horst Lasic – Helmut Krasser – Ernst Steinkellner (ed.), *Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 2. Part I: Critical Edition. Part II: Diplomatic Edition*. Ibid. 2012.

¹⁰ Ernst Frauwallner, Zur Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṅkhya-Systems. *WZKSÖ* 2 (1958) 84-139 (= *Kleine Schriften* [see n. 6 above], p. 223-277).

derstanding of an important part of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*(vṛtti), but also to the history of classical Sāṅkhya epistemology.

A crucial epistemological issue, namely, the number of means of knowledge, is also treated in Ernst Steinkellner's article "*anupalabdhi* as *pramāṇāntara* – Īśvarasena is the Opponent in *Tattvasaṅgraha* 1693-1694. With an Edition of *Tattvasaṅgraha* 1691-1697 and the *Pañjikā*". This article is the only contribution to the present volume that was not originally read as a paper in the aforementioned panel; it forms the twelfth of Steinkellner's "Miscellen zur erkenntnis-theoretisch-logischen Schule des Buddhismus". The article deals with several stanzas of Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* on the topic of combination (*yukti*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), which are claimed to be further means of knowledge, or means of valid cognition (*pramāṇāntara*), in addition to perception and inference, the sole means of knowledge accepted by Śāntarakṣita, following Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. In this connection, Śāntarakṣita mentions Caraka, the legendary author of the *Carakasamhitā*, and this early-classical foundational compilation on medicine indeed contains the brief treatment of a means of knowledge called *yukti*, even though it is not explicitly classified as a *pramāṇa* there. For non-perception as a means of knowledge, however, there is no evidence in the *Carakasamhitā*. In his criticism subsequent to the brief exposition of the two supposed additional means of knowledge, Śāntarakṣita treats both of them together. Relying on Kamalaśīla's commentary on the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, and on Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī* *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*, Steinkellner and his co-editors Horst Lasic and Helmut Krasser, in their preface to their collaborative edition of Chapter 2 of Jinendrabuddhi's commentary,¹¹ attributed not only the position that combination is a further means of knowledge to Caraka, but also the claim that non-perception is such a means of knowledge. However, on the basis of two passages in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, on which Śāntarakṣita seems to have based himself, Steinkellner corrects this attribution and now argues that Śāntarakṣita's second opponent here must be Īśvarasena, Dharmakīrti's teacher.

In addition to precise translations of all relevant stanzas of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and references to the crucial passages in Dharmakīrti's aforementioned works, Steinkellner provides a critical edition of the stanzas, together with the *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* thereon, in an appendix. Availing himself of the two printed editions of the *Tattvasaṅgraha* with its commentary, surrogates of the two extant manuscripts already used by the editors of the printed editions, namely, the Jaisalmer and the Patan manuscript, and the Tibetan translation of the text, Steinkellner is able to offer a more original, better text in four places and thus

¹¹ See n. 9 above.

contributes to an improved philological basis for further studies of the *Tattvasaṅgraha*.

Another contribution that concerns a basic aspect of the early-medieval science of *Pramāṇa* in South Asia, is John Taber's insightful and philosophically sensitive article "Dharmakīrti, *svataḥ prāmāṇyam*, and Awakening", in which Taber throws new light on Dharmakīrti's notion of the validity of cognitions (*prāmāṇya*), his complex attitude vis-à-vis the notion of intrinsic validity held by the orthodox-brahminical *Mīmāṃsakas*, and his much debated historical and intellectual relationship to the great *Mīmāṃsā* philosopher and exegete Kumāri-la. Taber closely examines various pertinent passages in Dharmakīrti's works and the work of his commentators and later expositors from these perspectives, some of which have received little scholarly attention so far. The passages selected by Taber are always treated in their specific contexts, such as the issue of the authorlessness of the *Veda* and the *Yogācāra* "transformation of the basis" in connection with the possibility of eliminating moral defects; these contexts are also illuminated by him in a clear and philosophically meaningful manner.

The most important result of Taber's analysis and study is that Dharmakīrti obviously accepted intrinsic validity of "knowing" in the context of salvific cognition or insight, i.e., the insight into selflessness, as opposed to the context of means of knowledge employed in every-day practice. Taber also compares Dharmakīrti's arguments and the precise wording of selected passages from his writings with Kumāri-la's arguments and demonstrates that in several cases the textual evidence does not warrant the conclusion that the former philosopher referred to the latter in his criticism,¹² whereas elsewhere, in the case of Dharmakīrti's statements on the luminous mind and the intrinsic validity of salvific insight, Taber points out striking coincidences, resonances and affinities in formulation between Dharmakīrti's arguments and some of Kumāri-la's arguments for the intrinsic validity of cognitions. However, rather than simply assuming that Dharmakīrti was influenced here by the *Mīmāṃsā* tradition, Taber convincingly argues also for the possibility of an evolution of Dharmakīrti's views from within the Buddhist tradition, specifically the philosophical tradition of monistic idealism (*vijñānavāda*). At the same time, he does not exclude that in the relevant context Dharmakīrti was possibly arguing with the *Mīmāṃsakas* on their own terms. Taber's concluding remarks on Dharmakīrti as a protean thinker and on the consequences one has to draw from this are also very valuable in terms of the hermeneutics of Dharmakīrti's works and philosophical works in general, as are Taber's reflections on the reformulation of the pertinent arguments and theories of philosophical opponents.

¹² See also the Addendum to Franco's paper in this volume.

Closely related in subject to Taber's contribution is Lawrence McCrea's "Justification, Credibility and Truth: Sucaritamīśra on Kumārila's Intrinsic Validity". In this extremely lucid article on a highly complex issue, McCrea focuses on Kumārila's famous concept of intrinsic validity (*svataḥ prāmāṇyam*) and its interpretation by the three most important commentators on Kumārila's Śloka-vārttika, namely, Umbeka, Sucaritamīśra and Pārthasārathimīśra. McCrea starts with Pārthasārathi's tract on *svataḥ prāmāṇyam* in his Nyāyamālā where Pārthasārathi outlines alternative views of insiders on three basic questions concerning the precise understanding of Kumārila's concept. McCrea's treatment of Pārthasārathi's exposition and critique of the interpretations proffered by Umbeka and Sucarita runs like a thread through this original, philosophically precise and brilliant paper and gives him the opportunity to analyze relevant passages in Umbeka's and Sucarita's commentaries on the Śloka-vārttika.

McCrea begins with a discussion of the criticism of Umbeka's interpretation voiced by John Taber and Dan Arnold, namely, that Umbeka's assumption of an actual arising of validity intrinsically, as opposed to its mere appearance, eventually implies extrinsic validity (*parataḥ prāmāṇyam*) and infinite regress (*anavasthā*) because the causes of cognitions or awarenesses need to be ascertained. However, McCrea rejects this criticism on the basis of an analysis of Umbeka's commentary on Śloka-vārttika Codanā 60 and 53 and demonstrates that also Pārthasārathi's criticism, which seems to have influenced Taber and Arnold's judgment in this matter, is not justified. He clarifies that Umbeka and Pārthasārathi are actually of the same opinion reached in different ways. Next, McCrea presents Sucarita's position on the meaning of validity, first as summarized and criticized by Pārthasārathi, namely, that validity – understood by Sucarita to arise intrinsically for all awarenesses, which are thus real valid awarenesses and do not only appear as such – consists in causing the determination of an object as it is, i.e., having just the form in which it appears as the object of an awareness. Again, now referring to Sucarita's own formulations, McCrea shows that Pārthasārathi's main reproach is unfounded because for Sucarita even an erroneous awareness is actually valid until it is falsified. McCrea further points out that Pārthasārathi's accusation that such a falsification is not possible because the awareness to be falsified no longer exists due to its momentariness can eventually be turned against his own position which emphasizes truth as the meaning of validity, also with a view to the authority of the Veda, and not just convincingness: Pārthasārathi therefore assumes that the appearance of validity intrinsically pertains to all awarenesses, but here, too, falsification of erroneous awarenesses would be impossible because of the momentariness of this appearance. Sucarita's theory of intrinsic validity of awarenesses in the sense of their being justified is then characterized by McCrea

as purely phenomenological. He further outlines the advantage of this interpretation of Kumāṛila's theory as compared with an interpretation that necessitates a distinction between apparent and real validity, as the interpretation set forth by Pārthasārathi and before him by Umbeka when they comment on Kumāṛila's use of the word "validity".

Before the backdrop of his analysis of Sucarita's position, McCrea suggests that for Kumāṛila the intrinsic real validity of awarenesses is subject to an open-ended process of falsification and re-justification (de-falsification): there are only "not currently falsified" and "currently falsified" awarenesses, the truth cannot be reached, something already addressed by Taber when he speaks of Kumāṛila's empiricism. In conclusion, McCrea relates Sucarita's position to Hume's empiricism-skepticism and to Kuhn's theory of the formation of scientific knowledge without reference to any final truth. Validity is fickle and eventually vulnerable, "justification without truth may be the best we can hope for, and all that we need".

The issue of the relative chronology of Dharmakīrti and Kumāṛila and whether they may have been familiar with each other's writings, addressed in Taber's contribution, is closely connected with the issue of Dharmakīrti's date. The common opinion on this date, which is of great relevance for the understanding and appreciation of Xuanzang's *oeuvre*, has recently been challenged. In "Xuanzang's Silence and Dharmakīrti's Dates", Eli Franco reviews the evidence bearing on this issue. Specifically, it critically deals with Helmut Krasser's dating of Dharmakīrti to the sixth century, which has gained approval from some leading scholars in the field of Buddhist philosophy and specialists in its logical-epistemological tradition, the most prominent among them being Vincent Eltschinger and Ernst Steinkellner. This new dating, presented *in extenso* in Krasser's contribution to the Bronkhorst felicitation volume,¹³ is essentially based on the claim that Dharmakīrti's writings were known to the Madhyamaka philosopher Bhāviveka (ca. middle of the sixth century) and thus Dharmakīrti has to be dated before the latter. Franco examines Krasser's evidence and argument in detail and shows it to be inconclusive, unconvincing or even flawed. The similarities in Dharmakīrti's and Bhāviveka's writings (in the latter case, Krasser includes the Tarkajvālā whose authorship is disputed) discussed by Krasser are far too vague to warrant his far-reaching conclusion. Franco also points out several methodical weaknesses in Krasser's textual comparisons, not only of passages in the writings of Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti, but also of

¹³ Helmut Krasser, Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti and Kumāṛila. In: *Devadattīyam*. Johannes Bronkhorst Felicitation Volume, ed. by F. Voegeli et al. [*Worlds of South and Inner Asia* 5]. Bern, 2012, p. 535-594.

passages in the works of Kumāṛila. Then Franco proceeds to examine further textual materials that were not taken into consideration by Krasser. In particular, he points out a striking similarity between stanza 5.9 of Bhāviveka's *Madhyamakakārikā* (whose translation by Krasser is shown to be problematic) and stanza 2.30 of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, which allows Franco to argue in favor of a new interpretation of the former stanza. Yet, he concludes that even strong similarities of this kind do not permit the determination of a relationship of direct dependence between the two relevant sources.

Furthermore, Franco argues that Xuanzang's silence about Dharmakīrti and his work needs to be considered in a larger perspective. He points out that Candrakīrti's silence as well as that of the Jaina philosophers before Akalaṅka is even more decisive for the question of Dharmakīrti's date than Xuanzang's silence, and observes that a further awkward consequence of Krasser's new dating would be that the seventh century would be devoid of known Buddhist philosophers, something which would be rather surprising if one considers the intense philosophical activity during the sixth and eighth centuries. Further, if Krasser would be right, this would cast Xuanzang in a negative light as a scholar who was not up to date, and perhaps out of his depth, with major developments in Buddhist logic and epistemology that would have happened already a century prior to his time. Franco concludes that the commonly accepted date of Dharmakīrti in the first half of the seventh century has to be maintained.

In an addendum, Franco makes a contribution to the controversial issue of the historical relationship between Dharmakīrti and Kumāṛila. He argues that Dharmakīrti was most probably familiar with Kumāṛila's *Bṛhaṭṭikā*, which is lost except for some fragments, but not with Kumāṛila's more mature work, the *Ślokavārttika*, and shows that the stanza *Pramāṇavārttika* 1.335cd is actually a quotation from the *Bṛhaṭṭikā*.

With Mingjun Tang's extensive article "Materials for the Study of Xuanzang's Inference of Consciousness-only (*wei shi bi liang* 唯識比量)", the focus of the present volume shifts to East Asia and the Chinese tradition of *Hetuvidyā*. Tang's rich contribution is concerned with Xuanzang's famous inference of consciousness-only, which is central to the further development of Chinese, Korean and Japanese "Buddhist logic" and provides the logical foundation of *Yogācāra* philosophy. Tang treats with great precision the explication, interpretation and further reception of this inference by Xuanzang's influential disciple Kuiji and subsequent East Asian scholars writing in Chinese, namely, Wengui, Tojūng, Jingyan, Wōnhyo and Zenju whose dates range from the seventh to the eighth century. The selection of textual materials quoted and translated after the extensive historical and literary introduction is especially valuable because

Xuanzang's own statements on this inference and on his concept of logic are only preserved by way of numerous fragments and paraphrases, first and foremost in its exposition in Kuiji's "Great Commentary on Hetuvidyā" (Yinming da shu 因明大疏). For the relevant works of Jingyan and Wengui, Tang also refers to text versions preserved among the Dunhuang manuscripts. Most of the materials presented by Tang in a logical and content-oriented order and supplied with references to relevant Chinese-language scholarship, have not yet been published and translated in a European language. In his introduction, which also addresses the South Asian background of Xuanzang's logic and presents a very concise summary of the crucial points treated in the selected materials, Tang attempts to unravel the textual history of the fragments preserved in the individual works and larger compilations, some of which are no longer available, and reconstructs their chronology.

The discussions of details of Xuanzang's inference by the aforementioned East Asian scholars are highly technical and revolve around possible faults of the reason – according to Dignāga's classification and its concise systematization in the Nyāyapraveśa (thus in any case pre-Dharmakīrtian) – of which the proponents of Xuanzang's inference may be accused. The discussions also address faults that may be detected in the refutation of such faults. The main issues are the following flaws of a reason: being unestablished by either of the two parties in a debate; being contradictory, in its Dignāgean varieties of proving something that is contradictory to the own nature of the property-possessor (i.e., "proving the opposite of the own nature of the subject of inference") and proving something that is contradictory to a specific attribute of the property-possessor (i.e., "proving the opposite of a specific quality of the subject of inference");¹⁴ being (commonly) inconclusive; and being contradictory and at the same time non-deviating (antinomic). Concerning the precise wording of the inference, the expressions "generally established" (or "well established", as rendered by Tang) (**prasiddha*, *ji cheng* 極成) and "accepted by us / that we accept" (*zi xu* 自許), the latter qualifying both the thesis and the reason together with its internal qualifications, are central points of discussion in terms of their precise logical functions and dialectical implications. A useful glossary of dialectical-logical terms in Chinese and English translation, with possible Sanskrit equivalents to which the Chinese terminology eventually goes back, concludes this contribution which will provide scholars of classical South Asian Buddhist logic and dialectics with a clear and philologically informed perspective on its continuation in China and beyond.

¹⁴ See also Moriyama's contribution to this volume.

The general issue of the mode and character of the transmission of South Asian Buddhist logic, that is, the logic of Dignāga as presented in his *Nyāyamukha* and in the *Nyāyapraveśa*, mainly in Tang-period China beginning with Xuanzang's translations of these two works, is addressed in Jakub Zamorski's article "On Chinese Interpretations of the Distinction Between Two Types of Negation in Indian Buddhist Logic". Zamorski does so by examining the topic of two types of negation as treated in commentaries on Xuanzang's translations whose starting point is a passage in the *Nyāyamukha* on the statement of similar and dissimilar examples in a valid inference. The crucial terms here are *zhequan* 遮詮 (roughly: "negating expression") and *zhilan* 止濫 ("stopping the overflow"), and it is their autochthonous interpretation, as well as further development and application, that is the focus and aim of the article, and not the determination of the originally underlying Sanskrit terms – probably *pariyudāsa* and *prasajyapariśedha*, based on the notion of two types of negation (implicative and non-implicative, term-bound and verb-bound, etc.) in Sanskrit grammatical science – and their meaning and interpretation in the South Asian context and the transmission of Dignāga's logic. The interpretation and usage of this pair of terms is intricately related to another pair, or rather dichotomy, that became much more important in Chinese Buddhist logic, namely, *zhequan* and *biaoquan* 表詮 ("affirming expression"). Other involved key notions are, in the area of ontology (and epistemology), the Dignāgean distinction between the two characteristics of things, specific characteristics and characteristics shared with other things (*svalakṣaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), and, in the area of philosophy of language, his concept of exclusion (*apoha*), as known in some form to the Chinese interpreters.

The earliest sources presented and examined by Zamorski are the commentaries by Shentai and Wengui, probably both disciples of Xuanzang, who apply the two first-mentioned terms to the different logical functions of the two types of examples. According to Zamorski, this resulted in a more or less literal understanding of *zhilan* (as opposed to the meaning of the probably underlying Sanskrit term *prasajyapariśedha*) and a connection to the issue of the ontological status of the examples in the eyes of the person who puts forth an inference and the person to whom it is addressed in a situation of "inference for another", and thus in a connection to the issue of existential negation. Zamorski further addresses this dichotomy by way of the analysis of statements of another student of Xuanzang's, the famous Kuiji, who connects it with two types of predicates in an inference that are not necessarily marked by a negation in the formation of the respective words, and with two types of status as regards the acceptance of the existence of the subject and predicate in an inference by the two involved disputants. In this interpretation, the dichotomy thus stands for a semantic dis-

tion, not a logical one. It is also Kuiji who introduces the second dichotomy, i.e., *zhequan* and *biaoquan*, in this context and relates it to similar examples and the ontological commitment or non-commitment to them. Zamorski emphasizes that this completely changes the meaning of *zhequan* (now: a negating expression as a non-implicative negation) as a complement of *biaoquan* (an affirming expression with a negating aspect, aligned with the basic principles of *apoha*). Thus, a terminologically confusing picture emerges, especially when compared to Shentai's statements. From here, the relevance of the terminology is further extended to Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy of language in general. Zamorski shows how under Kuiji's influence the notions of *zhequan* and *biaoquan* then became a key point of interest for later authors and were applied to Buddhist hermeneutics outside the field of logic, especially in Yogācāra works, with scholars like Woncheuk attempting to combine the two. Still another perspective on this second dichotomy is provided by the Chan master Guifeng Zongmi of the Huayan school and, finally, by modern East Asian exegetes.

Zamorski succeeds in demonstrating that the Chinese transmitters were not just translators, but rather engaged creative interpreters of South Asian Buddhist logical terms who had to face considerable difficulties because of various gaps: gaps in terms of the extent and nature of the transmitted materials, cultural gaps and last but not least linguistic gaps. Even so, as clearly shown in Zamorski's article, they developed complex notions and new fruitful concepts on a rather slim, sometimes not fully grasped basis in the course of their exegesis, among them concepts that became relevant also in other areas of Chinese Buddhist learning.

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